Category Archives: al-Qaeda

UK terror level raised to Severe

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From Snaphanen

UK Terror Threat Level Raised To ‘Severe’
Jo Couzens, Sky News Online
The terror threat level in the UK has been raised from “substantial” to “severe”, meaning an attack is “highly likely”.

Home Secretary Alan Johnson sought to reassure the public, saying: “I have to emphasise the fact it does not mean an attack is imminent.”
He said the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) keeps the threat level under constant review and makes its judgements based on a “broad range of factors”.
Mr Johnson said those factors include “the intent and capabilities

http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/UK-N…

Watch this story from Texas. There may be more too it

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Man charged in southeast Texas family slaying

Associated Press

Authorities have charged a 20-year-old man with capital murder in the shooting deaths of five family members, including his 2-year-old niece who also was decapitated.

Maron Thomas remains jailed under a $1 million bond, accused in the deaths of his mother, stepfather, sister, brother and niece.

Investigators said Wednesday that an ongoing family dispute led to the shootings, but they declined to give additional details.

The bodies of the five individuals were discovered Sunday in their single-story brick home in Bellville, a town of about 4,000 people 55 miles northwest of Houston.

Thomas was arrested about 3 a.m. Sunday after a homeowner pulled a gun on him after he broke into a vehicle and tried to break into a home 1 1/2 miles from where the murders took place.

(There are rumours that jihadi and specifically Al Queda materials were found in the home. Waiting for more on that.)

Report: American Ex-convicts In Yemen Pose ‘Significant Threat’

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U.S. Worried About Three Dozen Criminals Who Converted to Islam in Prison, Most from New York

The Muslim response to the problem, hire more prison imams. Scary thing is, some idiot in government will agree with them.

ABC VIDEO… As many as three dozen criminals who converted to Islam in American prisons have moved to Yemen where they could pose a “significant threat” to attack the U.S., according to a report on al Qaeda from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to be released Wednesday.

“The group seeks to recruit American citizens to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States,” said Sen. John Kerry, D.-Mass., the committee chairman.

The Senate report said that while the ex-convicts “ostensibly” moved to Yemen to study Arabic, U.S. diplomats and law enforcement officials in Yemen “feared that these Americans were radicalized in prison and traveled to Yemen for training.”

An American official said the prison converts were believed to be primarily from the New York state prison system.

Members of the Senate staff were told by U.S. law enforcement officials that FBI agents in Yemen did not have the resources to track the ex-cons and that several “have dropped off the radar” for weeks at a time.

U.S. law enforcement officials in Yemen are on “heightened alert because of the potential threat from extremists carrying American passports,” the report said.

Also of concern to U.S. officials, the Senate staff found, is a group of “nearly 10 non-Yemeni Americans who traveled to Yemen, converted to Islam, became fundamentalists and married Yemeni women so they could remain in the country.”

An American official described them as “blond-haired, blue eyed-types” who fit the profile of Americans who al Qaeda has sought to recruit for terror missions. Continue Reading →

US trains elite squad to ‘rescue’ Pakistani nukes.

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Like no one saw this coming at all. Thanks to GOV for the link to Times online

It is worth noting, Pakistan does not have nuclear power for electricity. But they do have the standard 40 megawatt reactor required for building bombs.

Elite US troops ready to combat Pakistani nuclear hijacks

The US army is training a crack unit to seal off and snatch back Pakistani nuclear weapons in the event that militants, possibly from inside the country’s security apparatus, get their hands on a nuclear device or materials that could make one.

The specialised unit would be charged with recovering the nuclear materials and securing them.

The move follows growing anti-Americanism in Pakistan’s military, a series of attacks on sensitive installations over the past two years, several of which housed nuclear facilities, and rising tension that has seen a series of official complaints by US authorities to Islamabad in the past fortnight.

“What you have in Pakistan is nuclear weapons mixed with the highest density of extremists in the world, so we have a right to be concerned,” said Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA officer who used to run the US energy department’s intelligence unit. “There have been attacks on army bases which stored nuclear weapons and there have been breaches and infiltrations by terrorists into military facilities.”

Professor Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan security research unit at Bradford University, has tracked a number of attempted security breaches since 2007. “The terrorists are at the gates,” he warned.

In a counterterrorism journal, published by America’s West Point military academy, he documented three incidents. The first was an attack in November 2007 at Sargodha in Punjab, where nuclearcapable F-16 jet aircraft are thought to be stationed. The following month a suicide bomber struck at Pakistan’s nuclear airbase at Kamra in Attock district. In August 2008 a group of suicide bombers blew up the gates to a weapons complex at the Wah cantonment in Punjab, believed to be one of Pakistan’s nuclear warhead assembly plants. The attack left 63 people dead.

A further attack followed at Kamra last October. Pakistan denies that the base still has a nuclear role, but Gregory believes it does. A six-man suicide team was arrested in Sargodha last August.

Fears that militants could penetrate a nuclear facility intensified after a brazen attack on army headquarters in Rawalpindi in October when 10 gunmen wearing army uniforms got inside and laid siege for 22 hours. Last month there was an attack on the naval command centre in Islamabad. Continue Reading →

STRATFOR: Kenya raids Somali Suburb.

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I wonder, is there a nation rich in the Multicultural goodness of Islam that does not have a massive problem with it? From Stratfor:

Kenya: Raid Conducted On Somali Suburb After Riots

January 17, 2010
Kenyan security forces raided a heavily Somali suburb of Nairobi Jan. 17, two days after the violent protests in the capital that followed the arrest of a Jamaican Muslim cleric, Reuters reported. Ahmed Nur Ugas, a Somali member of parliament, said police were arresting people they believed to be Somali whether they had legal identification or not, and that police did room-to-room searches of the Barakat Hotel, asking each occupant about their nationality.

Undercover Mosque from UK: Repost for 3rd aniversary

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Thanks to KitmanTV here are some really important videos which, if you have not already seen them, really need to be seen by all. Undercover Mosque is a TV documentary by England’s #4 where reporters were sent into major UK Mosques where they recorded secretly what was being said, often in mosques and by clerics who receive large government money for ‘interfaith dialogues’ and multi-faith programs’.

First, the actual documentary:

Dispatches – Undercover Mosque from Ole Olsen on Vimeo.

Here is a laughable attempt by the left and Muslim community to mitigate the damage done by exposing the hate taught daily at British Mosques

Here is a follow up interview with Abu Husama, another attempt to deflect:

Police excuse their behaviour towards the film makers:



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REUTERS: U.S. warns of possible attack in Malaysia’s Sabah

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A Bajau Laut girl basks on her boat in her neighbourhood in Sulawesi Sea in the Malaysia's state of Sabah on the Borneo island February 17, 2009. REUTERS/Bazuki Muhammad
KUALA LUMPUR (Reuters) – Police stepped up security after the United States Embassy in Malaysia warned on Friday that criminal and terrorist groups were planning attacks against foreigners in the Borneo island state of Sabah.

A “warden notice” posted on the embassy’s website (malaysia.usembassy.gov/), dated Friday, said resorts located in isolated areas of eastern Sabah, a state bordering the southern Philippines, were of “present concern.”

It identified areas of eastern Sabah including Semporna and the islands of Mabul and Sipadan, as well as travel to and from the area.

The warning said there were indications criminal and terrorist groups “are planning or intend acts violence against foreigners,” notwithstanding the Malaysian government’s ability to detect and prevent such attacks.

“Please avoid or use extreme caution in connection with any travel in these areas or locations,” it said.

The state’s island resorts are popular with tourists.

The warden notice said the Philippines-based, al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf militant group had kidnapped foreigners in eastern Sabah in the past. Criminal elements were also responsible for kidnapping and piracy, it said.

Malaysia’s deputy police chief, Ismail Omar, said his officers were taking all necessary steps.

“I have alerted all my officers in Sabah to boost security at all these places,” he told Reuters.

A U.S. embassy spokesman in Kuala Lumpur said such statements were issued periodically and the latest warning was posted “to enable people to make informed decisions about their security.”

The spokesman said there was a possibility the warning would be upgraded into an official travel advisory that would be issued by the U.S. State Department.

The Abu Sayyaf, known for kidnapping and beheading hostages, was nearly eliminated after the death of its founder and leader, Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, in the late 1990s.

It sprang back to life when about 20 Malaysian and Western tourists were kidnapped on Sipadan island in 2000. Analysts have said that proceeds from kidnappings may revive the small but deadly group.

(Editing by Paul Tait)

Kenyan police clash with Muslim Protestors

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I must say, the rest of the world could learn a few things about how to handle Muslims from the Kenyans. It appears they managed to get the better of the deal with a gang of rioting Muslims demanding that the Kenyan nation give in to all their demands. If only Western governments would allow regular people to defend thier own cultures, beliefs and societies then we could probably fix the problem of Islam in the west in a week. [I bolded the text below]

Eeyore
Kenya flag

Kenyan security forces shot in the air and fired tear gas at hundreds of people protesting in the capital on Friday against the detention of Jamaican Muslim cleric Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal.

The protesters, chanting “Allahu Akbar” (God is greatest) and some holding the flag of Somali rebel group al Shabaab, were blocked by police with dogs as they tried to march through the heart of Nairobi after prayers at the downtown mosque.

Some Kenyans, angry the attempted protest had taken place at all, joined forces with the security forces and began hurling stones at the marchers, squeezing them back towards the mosque.

“This is not an acceptable behaviour. The man who is supposed to be deported is not a Kenyan and his presence is not in the interest of Kenya these days,” said bystander Richard Odibo.

A helicopter clattered overhead and police also used water cannon to contain the clashes. Many protesters, some carrying pictures of Faisal on placards, were eventually corralled in the mosque but small groups continued hurling stones nearby.

A Reuters witness saw two policemen and four protesters injured by stones.

Faisal was visiting the east African nation for a preaching tour. Kenyan intelligence officials have said they fear his speeches could stoke radicalism in a country that has suffered two al Qaeda-linked attacks.

Faisal was deported from Britain in 2007 for preaching racial hatred and urging his audiences to kill Jews, Hindus and Westerners. He was arrested in Kenya on Dec. 31.

Kenya’s immigration minister Otieno Kajwang has declared Faisal a prohibited immigrant. Attempts by Kenya to deport him failed last week because Nigeria refused to give him a transit visa to Gambia.

Police sources told Reuters Faisal was being held at Nairobi’s international airport. Another source said the government would hold him in custody until he could be deported straight to Jamaica.

“One person, a Jamaican, how can he make the whole country shut down? One person, how come no one in Jamaica is defending him,” said a man in a group that charged the Muslim protesters.

“These demonstrators, they can go back home to Somalia if they want to,” he told Reuters Television.
Kenya hosts some 300,000 Somali refugees in refugee camps and there is a significant Somali community in Nairobi. There have been reports of rebel supporters recruiting fighters and young suicide bombers from the diaspora within Kenya.

Al Shabaab, a rebel group that Washington accuses of links to al Qaeda, is battling to overthrow the Somali government and impose their own hardline version of sharia law.

REUTERS

STRATFOR: Yemen: Cleric Renews Call For Jihad

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January 15, 2010
Yemeni cleric Sheikh Abdulmajeed al-Zendani said on Jan. 15 during a Friday prayer sermon that should Yemen become occupied by a foreign power, it would be a religious duty to defend the nation through jihad, Al Alam News reported. He said an order from God cannot be annulled by a king, a president or a committee of Muslim scholars. On Jan. 14, more than 150 Yemeni clerics said they would declare jihad if foreign troops continued involvement there.

Connecting the dots. US intel failures.

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Here are two separate articles but with a serious common theme. First, thanks to Fred for sending me the article about Timbuktu and the smuggling racket. And of course the important PJTV two part interview you will see below. Clearly these two issues relate to each other rather well. To paraphrase another failure of justice slogan, ‘If the glove fits; you must convict’. Do click the more button and read to the end, and then watch the PJTV interview which truly is stunning. There is something very very wrong in US intel circles. Whether it is deliberate avoidance of Islamic terror by the actual administration or sheer incompetence and naivete on a massive scale I do not know. But something is very wrong at the top.

Eeyore for Vlad

From Reuters.com

TIMBUKTU, Mali (Reuters) – In early 2008, an official at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security sent a report to his superiors detailing what he called “the most significant development in the criminal exploitation of aircraft since 9/11.”

The document warned that a growing fleet of rogue jet aircraft was regularly crisscrossing the Atlantic Ocean. On one end of the air route, it said, are cocaine-producing areas in the Andes controlled by the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. On the other are some of West Africa’s most unstable countries.

The report, a copy of which was obtained by Reuters, was ignored, and the problem has since escalated into what security officials in several countries describe as a global security threat.

The clandestine fleet has grown to include twin-engine turboprops, executive jets and retired Boeing 727s that are flying multi-ton loads of cocaine and possibly weapons to an area in Africa where factions of al Qaeda are believed to be facilitating the smuggling of drugs to Europe, the officials say.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been held responsible for car and suicide bombings in Algeria and Mauritania.

Gunmen and bandits with links to AQIM have also stepped up kidnappings of Europeans for ransom, who are then passed on to AQIM factions seeking ransom payments.

The aircraft hopscotch across South American countries, picking up tons of cocaine and jet fuel, officials say. They then soar across the Atlantic to West Africa and the Sahel, where the drugs are funneled across the Sahara Desert and into Europe.

An examination of documents and interviews with officials in the United States and three West African nations suggest that at least 10 aircraft have been discovered using this air route since 2006. Officials warn that many of these aircraft were detected purely by chance. They caution that the real number involved in the networks is likely considerably higher.

Alexandre Schmidt, regional representative for West and Central Africa for the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, cautioned in Dakar this week that the aviation network has expanded in the past 12 months and now likely includes several Boeing 727 aircraft.

“When you have this high capacity for transporting drugs into West Africa, this means that you have the capacity to transport as well other goods, so it is definitely a threat to security anywhere in the world,” said Schmidt.

The “other goods” officials are most worried about are weapons that militant organizations can smuggle on the jet aircraft. A Boeing 727 can handle up to 10 tons of cargo.

The U.S. official who wrote the report for the Department of Homeland Security said the al Qaeda connection was unclear at the time.

The official is a counter-narcotics aviation expert who asked to remain anonymous as he is not authorized to speak on the record. He said he was dismayed by the lack of attention to the matter since he wrote the report.

“You’ve got an established terrorist connection on this side of the Atlantic. Now on the Africa side you have the al Qaeda connection and it’s extremely disturbing and a little bit mystifying that it’s not one of the top priorities of the government,” he said.

Since the September 11 attacks, the security system for passenger air traffic has been ratcheted up in the United States and throughout much of the rest of the world, with the latest measures imposed just weeks ago after a failed bomb attempt on a Detroit-bound plane on December 25.

“The bad guys have responded with their own aviation network that is out there everyday flying loads and moving contraband,” said the official, “and the government seems to be oblivious to it.”

The upshot, he said, is that militant organizations — including groups like the FARC and al Qaeda — have the “power to move people and material and contraband anywhere around the world with a couple of fuel stops.” Continue Reading →

Stratfor: The Khost Attack and the Intelligence War Challenge

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By George Friedman and Scott Stewart of STRATFOR:

As Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi exited the vehicle that brought him onto Forward Operating Base (FOB) Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan, on Dec. 30, 2009, security guards noticed he was behaving strangely. They moved toward al-Balawi and screamed demands that he take his hand out of his pocket, but instead of complying with the officers’ commands, al-Balawi detonated the suicide device he was wearing.

The explosion killed al-Balawi, three security contractors, four CIA officers and the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) officer who was al-Balawi’s handler. The vehicle shielded several other CIA officers at the scene from the blast. The CIA officers killed included the chief of the base at Khost and an analyst from headquarters who reportedly was the agency’s foremost expert on al Qaeda. The agency’s second-ranking officer in Afghanistan was allegedly among the officers who survived.
Al-Balawi was a Jordanian doctor from Zarqa (the hometown of deceased al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi). Under the alias Abu Dujanah al-Khurasani, he served as an administrator for Al-Hesbah, a popular Internet discussion forum for jihadists. Jordanian officers arrested him in 2007 because of his involvement with radical online forums, which is illegal in Jordan. The GID subsequently approached al-Balawi while he was in a Jordanian prison and recruited him to work as an intelligence asset.
Al-Balawi was sent to Pakistan less than a year ago as part of a joint GID/CIA mission. Under the cover of going to school to receive advanced medical training, al-Balawi established himself in Pakistan and began to reach out to jihadists in the region. Under his al-Khurasani pseudonym, al-Balawai announced in September 2009 in an interview on a jihadist Internet forum that he had officially joined the Afghan Taliban.

A Lucky Break for the TTP

It is unclear if al-Balawi was ever truly repentant. Perhaps he cooperated with the GID at first, but had a change of heart sometime after arriving in Pakistan. Either way, at some point al-Balawi approached the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the main Pakistani Taliban group, and offered to work with it against the CIA and GID. Al-Balawi confirmed this in a video statement recorded with TTP leader Hakeemullah Mehsud and released Jan. 9. This is significant because it means that al-Balawi’s appearance was a lucky break for the TTP, and not part of some larger, intentional intelligence operation orchestrated by the TTP or another jihadist entity like al Qaeda.
The TTP’s luck held when a group of 13 people gathered to meet al-Balawi upon his arrival at FOB Chapman. This allowed him to detonate his suicide device amid the crowd and create maximum carnage before he was able to be searched for weapons.
In the world of espionage, source meetings are almost always a dangerous activity for both the intelligence officer and the source. There are fears the source could be surveilled and followed to the meeting site, or that the meeting could be raided by host country authorities and the parties arrested. In the case of a terrorist source, the meeting site could be attacked and those involved in the meeting killed. Because of this, the CIA and other intelligence agencies exercise great care while conducting source meetings. Normally they will not bring the source into a CIA station or base. Instead, they will conduct the meeting at a secure, low-profile offsite location
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Operating in the wilds of Afghanistan is far different from operating out of an embassy in Vienna or Moscow, however. Khost province is Taliban territory, and it offers no refuge from the watching eyes and gunmen of the Taliban and their jihadist allies. Indeed, the province has few places safe enough even for a CIA base. And this is why the CIA base in Khost is located on a military base, FOB Chapman, named for the first American killed in Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion. Normally, an outer ring of Afghan security around the base searches persons entering FOB Chapman, who the U.S. military then searches again at the outer perimeter of the U.S. portion of the base. Al-Balawi, a high-value CIA asset, was allowed to skip these external layers of security to avoid exposing his identity to Afghan troops and U.S. military personnel. Instead, the team of Xe (the company formerly known as Blackwater) security contractors were to search al-Balawi as he arrived at the CIA’s facility.
A Failure to Follow Security Procedures

Had proper security procedures been followed, the attack should only have killed the security contractors, the vehicle driver and perhaps the Jordanian GID officer. But proper security measures were not followed, and several CIA officers rushed out to greet the unscreened Jordanian source. Reports indicate that the source had alerted his Jordanian handler that he had intelligence pertaining to the location of al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. (There are also reports that al-Balawi had given his handlers highly accurate battle damage assessments on drone strikes in Pakistan, indicating that he had access to high-level jihadist sources.) The prospect of finally receiving such crucial and long-sought information likely explains the presence of the high-profile visitors from CIA headquarters in Langley and the station in Kabul — and their exuberance over receiving such coveted intelligence probably explains their eager rush to meet the source before he had been properly screened.
The attack, the most deadly against CIA personnel since the 1983 Beirut bombing, was clearly avoidable, or at least mitigable. But human intelligence is a risky business, and collecting human intelligence against jihadist groups can be flat-out deadly. The CIA officers in Khost the day of the bombing had grown complacent, and violated a number of security procedures. The attack thus serves as a stark reminder to the rest of the clandestine service of the dangers they face and of the need to adhere to time-tested security procedures.
A better process might have prevented some of the deaths, but it would not have solved the fundamental problem: The CIA had an asset who turned out to be a double agent. When he turned is less important than that he was turned into — assuming he had not always been — a double agent. His mission was to gain the confidence of the CIA as to his bona fides, and then create an event in which large numbers of CIA agents were present, especially the top al Qaeda analyst at the CIA. He knew that high-value targets would be present because he had set the stage for the meeting by dangling vital information before the agency. He went to the meeting to carry out his true mission, which was to deliver a blow against the CIA. He succeeded.
The Obama Strategy’s Weakness

In discussing the core weakness in the Afghan strategy U.S. President Barack Obama has chosen, we identified the basic problem as the intelligence war. We argued that establishing an effective Afghan army would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, because the Americans and their NATO allies lacked knowledge and sophistication in distinguishing friend from foe among those being recruited into the army. This problem is compounded by the fact that there are very few written documents in a country like Afghanistan that could corroborate identities. The Taliban would seed the Afghan army with its own operatives and supporters, potentially exposing the army’s operations to al Qaeda.
This case takes the problem a step further. The United States relied on Jordanian intelligence to turn a jihadist operative into a double agent. They were dependent on the Jordanian handler’s skills at debriefing, vetting and testing the now-double agent. It is now reasonable to assume the agent allowed himself to be doubled in an attempt to gain the trust of the handler. The Jordanians offered the source to the Americans, who obviously grabbed him, and the source passed all the tests to which he was undoubtedly subjected. Yet in the end, his contacts with the Taliban were not designed to provide intelligence to the Americans. The intelligence provided to the Americans was designed to win their trust and set up the suicide bombing. It is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that al-Balawi was playing the GID all along and that his willingness to reject his jihadist beliefs was simply an opportunistic strategy for surviving and striking.
Even though encountering al-Balawi was a stroke of luck for the TTP, the group’s exploitation of this lucky break was a very sophisticated operation. The TTP had to provide valuable intelligence to allow al-Balawi to build his credibility. It had to create the clustering of CIA agents by promising extraordinarily valuable intelligence. It then had to provide al-Balawi with an effective suicide device needed for the strike. And it had to do this without being detected by the CIA. Al-Balawi had a credible cover for meeting TTP agents; that was his job. But what al-Balawi told his handlers about his meetings with the TTP, and where he went between meetings, clearly did not indicate to the handlers that he was providing fabricated information or posed a threat.
In handling a double agent, it is necessary to track every step he takes. He cannot be trusted because of his history; the suspicion that he is still loyal to his original cause must always be assumed. Therefore, the most valuable moments in evaluating a double agent are provided by intense scrutiny of his patterns and conduct away from his handlers and new friends. Obviously, if this scrutiny was applied, al-Balawi and his TTP handlers were still able to confuse their observers. If it was not applied, then the CIA was setting itself up for disappointment. Again, such scrutiny is far more difficult to conduct in the Pakistani badlands, where resources to surveil a source are very scarce. In such a case, the intuition and judgment of the agent’s handler are critical, and al-Balawi was obviously able to fool his Jordanian handler.
Given his enthusiastic welcome at FOB Chapman, it would seem al-Balawi was regarded not only as extremely valuable but also as extremely reliable. Whatever process might have been used at the meeting, the central problem was that he was regarded as a highly trusted source when he shouldn’t have been. Whether this happened because the CIA relied entirely on the Jordanian GID for evaluation or because American interrogators and counterintelligence specialists did not have the skills needed to pick up the cues can’t be known. What is known is that the TTP ran circles around the CIA in converting al-Balawi to its uses.
The United States cannot hope to reach any satisfactory solution in Afghanistan unless it can win the intelligence war. But the damage done to the CIA in this attack cannot be underestimated. At least one of the agency’s top analysts on al Qaeda was killed. In an intelligence war, this is the equivalent of sinking an aircraft carrier in a naval war. The United States can’t afford this kind of loss. There will now be endless reviews, shifts in personnel and re-evaluations. In the meantime, the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan will be attempting to exploit the opportunity presented by this disruption.
Casualties happen in war, and casualties are not an argument against war. However, when the center of gravity in a war is intelligence, and an episode like this occurs, the ability to prevail becomes a serious question. We have argued that in any insurgency, the insurgents have a built-in advantage. It is their country and their culture, and they are indistinguishable from everyone else. Keeping them from infiltrating is difficult.
This was a different matter. Al-Balawi was Jordanian; his penetration of the CIA was less like the product of an insurgency than an operation carried out by a national intelligence service. And this is the most troubling aspect of this incident for the United States. The operation was by all accounts a masterful piece of tradecraft beyond the known abilities of a group like the TTP. Even though al-Balawi’s appearance was a lucky break for the TTP, not the result of an intentional, long-term operation, the execution of the operation that arose as a result of that lucky break was skillfully done — and it was good enough to deliver a body blow to the CIA. The Pakistani Taliban would thus appear far more skilled than we would have thought, which is the most important takeaway from this incident, and something to ponder

Another Mujahadeen auto-felating about killing people

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his is the video given to the BBC from Al Jazeera, claiming to be of the man who killed all those CIA operators in Afghanistan. I hope he is sucking dick in hell where he belongs like all terrorists. Remember, his motive for his ‘revenge’ against the West, is that he is not being allowed to oppress the Afghans and indeed the world with his barbaric pedophile religion. Less than 4% of Afghanis support the Taliban. For an excellent analysis of the fight in Afghanistan please click herehttp://vladtepesblog.com/?p=17188

LIAR, LIAR, PANTS ON FIRE. Christmas Day Terror Suspect Pleads Not Guilty

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Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab

 DETROIT —  A Nigerian man pleaded not guilty Friday to charges that he tried to blow up a packed U.S. Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas Day.

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab said little during a federal court hearing that lasted less than five minutes. The 23-year-old, who wore a white T-shirt, tennis shoes and light olive pants, said “yes” in English when asked if understood the charges against him.

Authorities say Abdulmutallab was traveling from Amsterdam when he tried to destroy the Northwest Airlines plane carrying nearly 300 people by injecting chemicals into a package of explosives concealed in his underwear. The failed attack caused popping sounds and flames that passengers and crew rushed to extinguish.

A grand jury indicted Abdulmutallab on six charges earlier this week. The most severe carries up to life in prison — the attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.

During Friday’s hearing, Abdulmutallab stood at the podium along with Assistant U.S. Attorney Jonathan Tukel and defense attorney Miriam Siefer and answered a few questions from Magistrate Judge Mark A. Randon.

When the judge asked if he had taken any drugs or alcohol in past 24 hours, he answered, “some pain pills.” Siefer then said he was competent to understand the proceedings. Abdulmutallab, who is being held at a federal prison in Milan, Mich., had been treated at a hospital for burns after the attack.

His attorneys then waived the reading of the indictment, and the judge entered not guilty plea enter on his behalf.