Category Archives: Espionage

Two news bits of note

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From Stratfor.com‘s agregator

U.S.: U.K. Flight Denied Entry
February 15, 2010
British Airways Flight 243 was denied entry into U.S. airspace because of a “data discrepancy” about a 55-year-old American passenger in what may have been the first time a British flight was denied access to American airspace, the Telegraph reported Feb. 15, officials said. The Boeing 747, with 318 passengers and crew, had been flying over the Atlantic for two hours when the discrepancy was spotted. Upon the return to London, the man and his luggage were searched, then he was handed over to immigration officials. It was not known if he was later released.

UAE: Warrants Issued In Hamas Official’s Slaying
February 15, 2010
Dubai Police Chief Dahi Khalfan Tamim said Feb. 15 that arrest warrants were being issued for 11 Europeans allegedly involved in the killing of senior Hamas official Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, Reuters reported. Tamim said police already have arrested two Palestinians suspected of providing logistical support for the killing and that officials are not ruling out the possibility of involvement by Israel.

Muslim women ‘radicalised’ in UK

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And apparently this happens at Universities. This calls for a repost of Prof. Martins rather clear condemnation of them at the end of this BBC article on the radicalization of women in the U.K. h/t snaphanen

On Monday a female suicide bomber killed 54 people in north-east Baghdad.

Dr Nazreen Nawaz, spokeswoman for Hizb ut-Tahrir
We don’t advocate that British Muslims go over and fight
Dr Nazreen Nawaz, Hizb ut-Tahrir

The attack may have happened on another continent, but there are increasing concerns that violent extremism among women may now also be increasing in the UK.

It is believed that the process of radicalisation often takes place at universities.

One Islamist group linked with this practice is Hizb ut-Tahrir.

While not itself connected to any terrorist acts, Hizb ut-Tahrir has courted controversy and politicians have seized on some of its more inflammatory views.

The Conservative Party has said it would ban the organisation altogether.

Nazreen Nawaz is a spokeswoman for the group. She became a member while studying medicine at King’s College London.

Today, sitting at her dining table in south London, she teaches her four-year-old daughter how to spell and explains her decision to join.

“The philosophy of Hizb ut-Tahrir offered me a view of Islam that could solve many of the problems in the Muslim world,” Dr Nawaz says. Continue Reading →

Venezuelan spies thrown out of Columbia

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From Stratfor:

Colombia: Suspected Venezuelan Spies Expelled
January 19, 2010
The Colombian Administrative Department of Security (DAS) arrested and deported two suspected Venezuelan spies in Valledupar, Cesar department, El Espectador reported Jan. 19. The Venezuelans, who were identified as Jose Vicente Marquez and Diego Jose Palomino, allegedly had a 40-minute recording detailing their surveillance of unidentified targets between Valledupar and Cucuta. Marquez reportedly is a security adviser for Zulia state, and Palomino is believed to be an active member of the Venezuelan National Guard

Code Pink To Muslim Brotherhood: ‘Help Us Cleanse Our Country’

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From News Real Blog: By way of TROP

cy Morgan

As Americans keep a wary eye on Muslim radicals in Yemen, little attention is being given to a far more dangerous enemy right in our own backyard. Under the banner of ‘anti-war’ activism, the radical group Code Pink is running banner advertisements on the English language version of the official Web site of a terrorist sympathizing group, the Muslim Brotherhood, one of which invites the Muslim Brotherhood to “join us in cleansing our country.” Continue Reading →

Stratfor: The Khost Attack and the Intelligence War Challenge

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By George Friedman and Scott Stewart of STRATFOR:

As Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi exited the vehicle that brought him onto Forward Operating Base (FOB) Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan, on Dec. 30, 2009, security guards noticed he was behaving strangely. They moved toward al-Balawi and screamed demands that he take his hand out of his pocket, but instead of complying with the officers’ commands, al-Balawi detonated the suicide device he was wearing.

The explosion killed al-Balawi, three security contractors, four CIA officers and the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) officer who was al-Balawi’s handler. The vehicle shielded several other CIA officers at the scene from the blast. The CIA officers killed included the chief of the base at Khost and an analyst from headquarters who reportedly was the agency’s foremost expert on al Qaeda. The agency’s second-ranking officer in Afghanistan was allegedly among the officers who survived.
Al-Balawi was a Jordanian doctor from Zarqa (the hometown of deceased al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi). Under the alias Abu Dujanah al-Khurasani, he served as an administrator for Al-Hesbah, a popular Internet discussion forum for jihadists. Jordanian officers arrested him in 2007 because of his involvement with radical online forums, which is illegal in Jordan. The GID subsequently approached al-Balawi while he was in a Jordanian prison and recruited him to work as an intelligence asset.
Al-Balawi was sent to Pakistan less than a year ago as part of a joint GID/CIA mission. Under the cover of going to school to receive advanced medical training, al-Balawi established himself in Pakistan and began to reach out to jihadists in the region. Under his al-Khurasani pseudonym, al-Balawai announced in September 2009 in an interview on a jihadist Internet forum that he had officially joined the Afghan Taliban.

A Lucky Break for the TTP

It is unclear if al-Balawi was ever truly repentant. Perhaps he cooperated with the GID at first, but had a change of heart sometime after arriving in Pakistan. Either way, at some point al-Balawi approached the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the main Pakistani Taliban group, and offered to work with it against the CIA and GID. Al-Balawi confirmed this in a video statement recorded with TTP leader Hakeemullah Mehsud and released Jan. 9. This is significant because it means that al-Balawi’s appearance was a lucky break for the TTP, and not part of some larger, intentional intelligence operation orchestrated by the TTP or another jihadist entity like al Qaeda.
The TTP’s luck held when a group of 13 people gathered to meet al-Balawi upon his arrival at FOB Chapman. This allowed him to detonate his suicide device amid the crowd and create maximum carnage before he was able to be searched for weapons.
In the world of espionage, source meetings are almost always a dangerous activity for both the intelligence officer and the source. There are fears the source could be surveilled and followed to the meeting site, or that the meeting could be raided by host country authorities and the parties arrested. In the case of a terrorist source, the meeting site could be attacked and those involved in the meeting killed. Because of this, the CIA and other intelligence agencies exercise great care while conducting source meetings. Normally they will not bring the source into a CIA station or base. Instead, they will conduct the meeting at a secure, low-profile offsite location
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Operating in the wilds of Afghanistan is far different from operating out of an embassy in Vienna or Moscow, however. Khost province is Taliban territory, and it offers no refuge from the watching eyes and gunmen of the Taliban and their jihadist allies. Indeed, the province has few places safe enough even for a CIA base. And this is why the CIA base in Khost is located on a military base, FOB Chapman, named for the first American killed in Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion. Normally, an outer ring of Afghan security around the base searches persons entering FOB Chapman, who the U.S. military then searches again at the outer perimeter of the U.S. portion of the base. Al-Balawi, a high-value CIA asset, was allowed to skip these external layers of security to avoid exposing his identity to Afghan troops and U.S. military personnel. Instead, the team of Xe (the company formerly known as Blackwater) security contractors were to search al-Balawi as he arrived at the CIA’s facility.
A Failure to Follow Security Procedures

Had proper security procedures been followed, the attack should only have killed the security contractors, the vehicle driver and perhaps the Jordanian GID officer. But proper security measures were not followed, and several CIA officers rushed out to greet the unscreened Jordanian source. Reports indicate that the source had alerted his Jordanian handler that he had intelligence pertaining to the location of al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. (There are also reports that al-Balawi had given his handlers highly accurate battle damage assessments on drone strikes in Pakistan, indicating that he had access to high-level jihadist sources.) The prospect of finally receiving such crucial and long-sought information likely explains the presence of the high-profile visitors from CIA headquarters in Langley and the station in Kabul — and their exuberance over receiving such coveted intelligence probably explains their eager rush to meet the source before he had been properly screened.
The attack, the most deadly against CIA personnel since the 1983 Beirut bombing, was clearly avoidable, or at least mitigable. But human intelligence is a risky business, and collecting human intelligence against jihadist groups can be flat-out deadly. The CIA officers in Khost the day of the bombing had grown complacent, and violated a number of security procedures. The attack thus serves as a stark reminder to the rest of the clandestine service of the dangers they face and of the need to adhere to time-tested security procedures.
A better process might have prevented some of the deaths, but it would not have solved the fundamental problem: The CIA had an asset who turned out to be a double agent. When he turned is less important than that he was turned into — assuming he had not always been — a double agent. His mission was to gain the confidence of the CIA as to his bona fides, and then create an event in which large numbers of CIA agents were present, especially the top al Qaeda analyst at the CIA. He knew that high-value targets would be present because he had set the stage for the meeting by dangling vital information before the agency. He went to the meeting to carry out his true mission, which was to deliver a blow against the CIA. He succeeded.
The Obama Strategy’s Weakness

In discussing the core weakness in the Afghan strategy U.S. President Barack Obama has chosen, we identified the basic problem as the intelligence war. We argued that establishing an effective Afghan army would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, because the Americans and their NATO allies lacked knowledge and sophistication in distinguishing friend from foe among those being recruited into the army. This problem is compounded by the fact that there are very few written documents in a country like Afghanistan that could corroborate identities. The Taliban would seed the Afghan army with its own operatives and supporters, potentially exposing the army’s operations to al Qaeda.
This case takes the problem a step further. The United States relied on Jordanian intelligence to turn a jihadist operative into a double agent. They were dependent on the Jordanian handler’s skills at debriefing, vetting and testing the now-double agent. It is now reasonable to assume the agent allowed himself to be doubled in an attempt to gain the trust of the handler. The Jordanians offered the source to the Americans, who obviously grabbed him, and the source passed all the tests to which he was undoubtedly subjected. Yet in the end, his contacts with the Taliban were not designed to provide intelligence to the Americans. The intelligence provided to the Americans was designed to win their trust and set up the suicide bombing. It is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that al-Balawi was playing the GID all along and that his willingness to reject his jihadist beliefs was simply an opportunistic strategy for surviving and striking.
Even though encountering al-Balawi was a stroke of luck for the TTP, the group’s exploitation of this lucky break was a very sophisticated operation. The TTP had to provide valuable intelligence to allow al-Balawi to build his credibility. It had to create the clustering of CIA agents by promising extraordinarily valuable intelligence. It then had to provide al-Balawi with an effective suicide device needed for the strike. And it had to do this without being detected by the CIA. Al-Balawi had a credible cover for meeting TTP agents; that was his job. But what al-Balawi told his handlers about his meetings with the TTP, and where he went between meetings, clearly did not indicate to the handlers that he was providing fabricated information or posed a threat.
In handling a double agent, it is necessary to track every step he takes. He cannot be trusted because of his history; the suspicion that he is still loyal to his original cause must always be assumed. Therefore, the most valuable moments in evaluating a double agent are provided by intense scrutiny of his patterns and conduct away from his handlers and new friends. Obviously, if this scrutiny was applied, al-Balawi and his TTP handlers were still able to confuse their observers. If it was not applied, then the CIA was setting itself up for disappointment. Again, such scrutiny is far more difficult to conduct in the Pakistani badlands, where resources to surveil a source are very scarce. In such a case, the intuition and judgment of the agent’s handler are critical, and al-Balawi was obviously able to fool his Jordanian handler.
Given his enthusiastic welcome at FOB Chapman, it would seem al-Balawi was regarded not only as extremely valuable but also as extremely reliable. Whatever process might have been used at the meeting, the central problem was that he was regarded as a highly trusted source when he shouldn’t have been. Whether this happened because the CIA relied entirely on the Jordanian GID for evaluation or because American interrogators and counterintelligence specialists did not have the skills needed to pick up the cues can’t be known. What is known is that the TTP ran circles around the CIA in converting al-Balawi to its uses.
The United States cannot hope to reach any satisfactory solution in Afghanistan unless it can win the intelligence war. But the damage done to the CIA in this attack cannot be underestimated. At least one of the agency’s top analysts on al Qaeda was killed. In an intelligence war, this is the equivalent of sinking an aircraft carrier in a naval war. The United States can’t afford this kind of loss. There will now be endless reviews, shifts in personnel and re-evaluations. In the meantime, the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan will be attempting to exploit the opportunity presented by this disruption.
Casualties happen in war, and casualties are not an argument against war. However, when the center of gravity in a war is intelligence, and an episode like this occurs, the ability to prevail becomes a serious question. We have argued that in any insurgency, the insurgents have a built-in advantage. It is their country and their culture, and they are indistinguishable from everyone else. Keeping them from infiltrating is difficult.
This was a different matter. Al-Balawi was Jordanian; his penetration of the CIA was less like the product of an insurgency than an operation carried out by a national intelligence service. And this is the most troubling aspect of this incident for the United States. The operation was by all accounts a masterful piece of tradecraft beyond the known abilities of a group like the TTP. Even though al-Balawi’s appearance was a lucky break for the TTP, not the result of an intentional, long-term operation, the execution of the operation that arose as a result of that lucky break was skillfully done — and it was good enough to deliver a body blow to the CIA. The Pakistani Taliban would thus appear far more skilled than we would have thought, which is the most important takeaway from this incident, and something to ponder

Bill Whittle does a truly exceptional bit of real journalism. Terrorists set agenda

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Remember when reporters actually went out to the field and interviewed people who had things to say that mattered for the preservation of American and indeed, western civilized interests? Well Bill Whittle at PJTV has out done himself here, which is hard to do as he has done so many excellent segments for Pajamas TV like this one. Really, all of you who can have one less Cappuccino a month, please buy a membership to PJTV, not just for your own sakes but for all of us. PJTV is a genuine public service.

PJTV’s Bill Whittle Islamic infiltration from Vlad Tepes on Vimeo.

Venezuela: Evidence On 2009 U.S. Incursion Claimed

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From STRATFOR

January 5, 2010
Venezuelan Vice President and Defense Minister Ramon Carrizales said Jan. 5 that evidence exists of an incursion into Venezuela by a U.S. military aircraft from Curacao on May 17, 2009, El Universal reported. Carrizales claimed the government has recordings of inquiries made to the aircraft’s crew by air traffic controllers and flight charts that show it violated Venezuelan airspace and flew into a restricted area near La Orchila air base

Venezuela: Evidence On 2009 U.S. Incursion ClaimedJanuary 5, 2010Venezuelan Vice President and Defense Minister Ramon Carrizales said Jan. 5 that evidence exists of an incursion into Venezuela by a U.S. military aircraft from Curacao on May 17, 2009, El Universal reported. Carrizales claimed the government has recordings of inquiries made to the aircraft’s crew by air traffic controllers and flight charts that show it violated Venezuelan airspace and flew into a restricted area near La Orchila air base

Next they will offer him a gig as a soprano on a boys choir

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Thanks Fausta for the tip

From Big Government

Jaw-dropping story in today’s Washington Post:

*Dec 28 - 00:05*

President Obama’s chief counterterrorism adviser on Sunday defended the administration’s decision to try in federal court the man charged with attempting to bomb an airliner on Christmas Day and indicated that he would be offered a plea agreement to persuade him to reveal what he knows about al-Qaeda operations in Yemen.

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the 23-year-old Nigerian charged with the failed attempt on the Amsterdam-to-Detroit flight, was initially “talking to people who detained him” but now has a public defender and “doesn’t have to,” John O. Brennan said on “Fox News Sunday.”

“We have different ways of obtaining information from individuals” in the criminal-justice process, Brennan said on NBC’s “Meet the Press.” “A lot of people . . . understand what they’re facing, and their lawyers recognize that there is advantage to talking to us in terms of plea agreements, [and] we’re going to pursue that.” Brennan told CNN’s “State of the Union” that other terrorism suspects have “given us very valuable information as they’ve gone through the plea-agreement process.”

Consider this excerpt:

Abdulmutallab’s father “said he was consorting with extremists in Yemen,” Brennan added. “. . . He was concerned about him, he wanted our help. That was one set of data. We had, though, other data within the intelligence system . . . that didn’t give us the clarity we needed to be able to map it and attach it to Abdulmutallab.”

Read the whole article here. Whiskey, tango, foxtrot…they’re going to offer the bomber a plea agreement?? Brennan states that, despite warnings from the bomber’s own father, the Administration didn’t have the “clarity” to determine Mr. Abdulmutallab was a threat. Offering him a plea agreement–through his court-appointed public defender–suggests the Administration won’t achieve “clarity” anytime soon.

Taking stock of Iran: Iran attacks German satellite

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Lets see:

Iran is fighting a proxy war against Saudi Arabia by funding militants in Yemen.

Iran recently sent men and tanks to take over an Iraqi oil well a good distance within Iraq and took down the Iraq flag and hoisted an Iranian one

Iran is funding and equipping the terrorists in Gaza to attack Israel and at this time also Egypt. It is worth remembering that there is a main street in Tehran named after the man who murdered Anwar Sedat for having made peace with Israel.

Iran of course has Hizbolah cells that have all but taken over Lebanon and have a great deal of influence in Syria. Now Hizbolah has serious bases in Venezuela and will certainly give Chavez a lot more than he bargained for when the US is forced to retaliate for Hizbolah actions originating out of Venezuela, as is more and more likely.

Now we have this from The Local.DE with a deep thanks to the Baron over at GOV

Photo: DPA

Iran interferes with German news satellite

Published: 2 Jan 10 11:55 CET
Online: http://www.thelocal.de/national/20100102-24309.html

The German state foreign broadcasting network Deutsche Welle (DW) was the target of a deliberate jamming signal originating in Iran, according to a report in news magazine Der Spiegel.

According to the report, the French national radio regulatory agency Agence Nationale des Fréquences wrote to the Iranian Ministry of Communication saying that on December 7 and December 8 signals had been detected that looked like “deliberate interference” with the DW satellite.

The affected satellite was the Hot-Bird satellite belonging to Eutelsat. The satellite operators apparently reacted to the disturbance by increasing the broadcasting power, whereupon the disturbance signal was also strengthened, cutting out an Arabian language TV broadcast from DW.

The origin of the disturbance was traced to the area of Tehran. Similar disturbances coming from Iran were already detected by the French authority in May and June 2009.

The Local (ne**@******al.de)

The UK has been accused of being a menace to the outside world

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Britain blamed for rise in Islamic extremism: From emigrate.co.uk

The UK has been accused of being a menace to the outside world, as the perception by American’s that the Britain has failed to tackle Islamic extremism boiled over.

Policymakers in the US said the attempted bombing of a flight to Detroit by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who is believed to have been radicalised in London, was further evidence that one of the biggest threats to the US came from the UK, where the capital has been called ‘Londonistan’, by some critics.

There has also been criticism of the ghettoism of Muslims in Britain, compared with the assimilation in America.

Former chief speechwriter for George W Bush Marc Thiessen claimed Muslim immigrants in the US were far better integrated in society and considered themselves as American within a generation, as the US embraced the melting pot concept.

He went on to say that it did not exist in Europe in the same way, particularly in Britain, which is far more socially stratified society than in the US.

A scholar on radical Islam and former adviser to Rudolph Giuliani during his presidential campaign argued that the UK is a menace to the outside world, which has been a problem for many years, and this is just another example.

The Home Office denied Abdulmutallab a student visa in May and placed him on an immigration watch list, but did not pass the information to the US.

Thiessen also said that the US, as a result, was in grave danger due to the fact that defences have been lowered by doing away with vital tools on the war on terror that have been proven as successful.

More on the thong-bomber

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First here is a short video on what that explosive can do in small amounts, and then some on his background:

Now, pasted from a well researched article from Gates of Vienna. However this does not include the revelation that 4 conspirators had art therapy in Saudi Arabia after being released from Gitmo:

Monday, December 28, 2009

Flight 253: Pentrite, an Accomplice, and Cheers on 9-11

by Baron Bodissey

Our Flemish correspondent VH has collected and translated the latest Dutch-language material related to Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab and the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day.

First, concerning the explosive Pentrite, an entry from Stan de Jong’s blog:

Pentrite, the favorite explosive of terrorists

by Percolator

Christmas Day, 2009. Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, a Nigerian Muslim terrorist, a son of the wealthy Islamic Banker hajj Umaru Abdul Mutallab (who had sixteen children)[1], wanted to blow himself up together with almost three hundred other people on board an aircraft approaching Detroit airport, as seems to have been announced in an Al Qaeda video days before (December 21)[2]. For this attack Mutallab made use of the explosive pentrite (pentaerythritol tetranitrate, or PETN). This substance is one of the major components of the dreaded semtex.

The reason explosives such as pentrite and semtex are so popular with terrorists is that they are relatively easily available on the free market and have an enormous destructive power. Moreover, these explosives cannot be detected by metal detectors and X-ray equipment, which are used as standard equipment during check-in at airports.

Modern 3D body scanning devices would easily be able to detect explosives such as were attached to the leg of Abdul Mutallab. But yes, cost and privacy, eh. In the Netherlands this is decisive. The government does not care[3] about a few hundred lives when some euros can be saved. Fortunately there are bold types like Jasper Schuringa (and brave cabin crews)[4] aboard threatened aircraft. Otherwise there would currently much sadder news to report.

To give an impression of what exploding pentrite may cause, here a few images of amateur experiments with this material: 8 grams, 20 grams and 250 grams. [And here when mixed with Ammonium nitrate. The Muslim terrorist had 80 grams of PETN on him, while 50 grams would be enough blow away part of the hull and sections of the wiring of an aircraft: here a video: 90g mixed with 200g ANFO.]

That this attack was planned for Christmas also gives a nice glimpse into the twisted minds of the Muslim fundamentalists. The Western authorities always exert extreme efforts to imprint in the indigenous bourgeoisie a display of respect for Muslim festivals and customs. But reciprocity will not be a part of this for a while yet, I fear.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * Continue Reading →

M.E.N.D. Issues curious statement.

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M.E.N.D., a terrorist group for the emancipation of the Niger Delta has issued a statement about the Nigerian Muslim who attempted to bring down a U.S. Jet over Detroit Dec. 25th. In this statement, they appear to insinuate that the Government of Nigeria, who they fight, is complicit with Islamist forces wordwide and that the worlds microscope should focus more on the Islamic forces within Nigeria, as opposed to MEND and it’s activities. While this is not surprising, it may contain at least a grain of truth.

Eeyore for Vlad

MEND reacts to attempted terrorist attack on US plane

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has condemned the attempted attack on the Delta Flight 253 bound for the United States by a Nigerian youth, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

“The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) condemns the attempted act of terrorism on Delta flight 253 into the United States by a misguided Islamic extremist from the Northern part of Nigeria,” the statement, signed by its leader, Jomo Gbomo, said. “Had the plan been successful, it would have left many families across the globe grieving on a day when Christians celebrate the birth of a peace maker, Jesus Christ.

“It should by now be evident that the threat to world peace will not emerge from the Niger Delta, a region agitating for justice as is acknowledged by every right thinking human being, but from the Islamic extremist northern part of Nigeria covertly supported by its elite who assume leadership of Nigeria to be the birthright of this region.”

In the statement, the group suggested that the Niger Delta is unfairly singled out for violent acts, saying “The Nigerian government has persistently turned a blind eye to Islamic extremists coming from Northern Nigeria, choosing instead to focus and waste its resources on military hardware and troop deployment in the Niger Delta. In spite of this embarrassment to the nation, the government will not re-direct its military to the North, neither will the rights of these violent people be trampled as is the case in the Niger Delta.

The group also suggested that Mr. Mutallab had Nigerian cohorts. “The young man who attempted this cowardly act is not alone,” Mr Gbomo said. “And governments around the world should pay more attention to northern Nigeria with its threat to world peace than to agitation for justice in the Niger Delta which only threatens world oil prices.”

The group did not provide any material or names to support the assertions or name the specific groups in the North which it claims are threats to world peace.

It will be recalled that, based on reports, the young man has not been close to his Nigerian home for a long time. According to the country’s minister for information, speaking to the press on Sunday, “The man in question has lived outside the country for a while. He sneaked into Nigeria on December 24 2009 and left the same day.” His father had also earlier reported his son’s activities to the US authorities in Nigeria.

A Dutch Hero. “Let’s Roll II”

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From the youtube link:
Jasper Schuringa, a 32-year-old film maker from Amsterdam, is being lauded as the primary hero after he led the charge to subdue would-be attacker Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on Northwest flight 253 yesterday. As the flight approached Detroit, Abdulmutallab worked to ignite what seems to be an incendiary device meant to light the plane on fire. Continue Reading →

Martin Mawyer on CFRA speaks about Islamberg

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Martin Mawyer, the founder of The Christian Action Network, and the man who made the movie, ‘Home Grown Jihad’ where the C.A.N. took hidden video of the goings on within domestic USA terrorist camps (at great personal risk) speaks to Nick Vandergragt of Ottawa Canada’s AM talk radio station CFRA 580 December 26th.

Martin and his organization should be listened to. They have a lot to say that needs to be known.

Enjoy.
The footage I placed over the interview is initially a trailer for Homegrown Jihad, then some footage from the movie as well which repeats about every 8 minutes.

Martin Mawyer CFRA from Vlad Tepes on Vimeo.