Al Qaeda’s New Video: A Message of Defeat

Al Qaeda’s New Video: A Message of Defeat is republished with permission of  STRATFOR.

Al Qaeda's New Video: A Message of Defeat

 

By Scott Stewart

A new video from al Qaeda’s media arm, As-Sahab, became available on the Internet on June 2. The video was 100 minutes long, distributed in two parts and titled “Responsible Only for Yourself.” As the name suggests, this video was the al Qaeda core’s latest attempt to encourage grassroots jihadists to undertake lone-wolf operations in the West, a recurrent theme in jihadist messages since late 2009.

The video, which was well-produced and contained a number of graphics and special effects, features historical footage of a number of militant Islamist personalities, including Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abdullah Azzam and Abu Yahya al-Libi.

In addition to al-Libi, who is considered a prominent al Qaeda ideological authority, the video also features an extensive discourse from another Libyan theologian, Sheikh Jamal Ibrahim Shtaiwi al-Misrati. Al-Misrati (who is from Misurata, as one can surmise from his name) was also featured in a March 25 As-Sahab message encouraging jihadists in Libya to assume control of the country and place it under Shariah once the Gadhafi regime is overthrown. The still photo used over the March message featuring al-Misrati was taken from the video used in the June 2 message, indicating that the recently released video of al-Misrati was shot prior to March 25. The video also contains a short excerpt of a previously released Arabic language Al-Malahim media video by Anwar al-Awlaki and an English-language statement by Adam Gadahn that is broken up into small segments and appears periodically throughout the video.

Despite the fact that many of the video segments used to produce this product are quite dated, there is a reference to bin Laden as a shaheed, or martyr, so this video was obviously produced after his death.

Unlike the As-Sahab message on the same topic featuring Adam Gadahn released in March 2010 and the English-language efforts of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s “Inspire” magazine, this video is primarily in Arabic, indicating that it is intended to influence an Arabic-speaking audience.

To date, much of the media coverage pertaining to the release of this video has focused on one short English-language segment in which Adam Gadahn encourages Muslims in the United States to go to gun shows and obtain automatic weapons to use in shooting attacks. This focus is understandable given the contentiousness of the gun-control issue in the United States, but a careful examination of the video reveals far more than just fodder for the U.S. gun-control debate.

 

Contents of the Video

 

The first 36 minutes of the video essentially comprise a history lesson of militants who heard the call to jihad and then acted on it. Among the examples are individuals such as ElSayyid Nosair, the assassin of Jewish Defense League founder Meir Kahane; Abdel Basit (also known as Ramzi Yousef), the operational planner of the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the thwarted Bojinka plot; Mohammed Bouyeri, the assassin of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh; and Fort Hood shooter Nidal Malik Hasan. Others include the leader of the team of assassins who killed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the militants behind the Mumbai attacks.

Then, after listing those examples, the video emphasizes the point that if one is to live in the “real Islamic way,” one must also follow the examples of the men profiled. Furthermore, since the “enemies of Islam” have expanded their “attacks against Islam” in many different places, the video asserts that it is not only in the land of the Muslims that the enemies of Islam must be attacked, but also in their homelands (i.e., the West). In fact, the video asserts that it is easy to strike the enemies of Islam in their home countries and doing so creates the biggest impact. And this is the context in which Gadahn made his widely publicized comment about Muslims buying guns and conducting armed assaults.

Now, it is important to briefly address this comment by Gadahn: While it is indeed quite easy for U.S. citizens to legally purchase a wide variety of firearms, it is illegal for them to purchase fully automatic weapons without first obtaining the proper firearms license. This fixation with obtaining fully automatic rifles instead of purchasing readily available and legal semi-automatic weapons has led to the downfall of a number of jihadist plots inside the United States, including one just last month in New York. Therefore, aspiring jihadists who would seek to follow Gadahn’s recommendations to the letter would almost certainly find themselves quickly brought to the attention of the authorities.

When we look at the rest of Gadahn’s comments in this video, it is clear the group is trying to convey a number of other interesting points. First, Gadahn notes that jihadists wanting to undertake lone-wolf activities must take all possible measures to keep their plotting secret, and the first thing they should do is avail themselves of all the electronic manuals available on the Internet pertaining to security.

A few minutes later in the video, Gadahn remarks on a point made in a segment from a U.S. news program that the Hollywood perception of the capabilities of the National Security Agency (NSA) is nowhere near what those capabilities are in real life and that, while the NSA and other Western intelligence agencies collect massive amounts of data, it is hard for them to link the pieces together to gain intelligence on a pending attack plan. This is true, and the difficulty of putting together disparate intelligence to complete the big picture is something STRATFOR has long discussed. Gadahn notes that the downfall of most grassroots operations is loose lips and not the excellence of Western intelligence and urges aspiring grassroots jihadists to trust no one and to reveal their plans to no one, not even friends and family members. This claim is also true. Most thwarted grassroots plots have been uncovered due to poor operational security and sloppy tradecraft.

The video also contains lengthy theological discussions justifying the jihadist position that jihad is a compulsory, individual obligation for every able-bodied Muslim. As the video turns to the necessity of attacking the enemies of Islam in their homelands, Gadahn notes that Americans are people who crave comfort and security and that terrorist attacks scare them and take away their will to fight Muslims. According to Gadahn, terrorist attacks also cause the people to object to leaders who want to attack Islam, and the people will not vote for those leaders. Continue Reading →

STRATFOR Sitrep: Somalia’s Al Shabab plans to attack outside Somalia, including continental USA

STRATFOR:

June 9, 2011
The threat Somali militant group al Shabaab poses to U.S. and Western interests both in the Horn of Africa and the continental United States is significant and rising, CIA Director Leon Panetta will tell the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on June 9, AFP reported. Al Shabaab has claimed ties with al Qaeda since 2007 and is developing relations with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Panetta says in written responses to the committee. The Somali militants are showing an increased interest in attacking international targets, according to Panetta. He said it was important to ensure that al Qaeda does not relocate to Somalia after it undergoes leadership changes and regroups from counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan.

The Bin Laden Operation: Tapping Human Intelligence

The following report is a STRATFOR report by Fred Burton. Mr. Burton wrote a book called Ghost, which is about the search and capture of the principles involved with the first WTC attack in 91 under Clinton. I strongly recommend this highly informative and entertaining book. Once you start it, you cannot put it down, and will be well informed when you have finished it on some of the inner workings of the FBI, DSS and so on. In fact, once you have read it, you can spot both the errors and changes to the facts in the excellent three part movie, ‘The Path to 911’ which is also well worth the time to watch and is also very entertaining.

From STRATFOR:



The Bin Laden Operation: Tapping Human Intelligence

By Fred Burton

Since May 2, when U.S. special operations forces crossed the Afghan-Pakistani border and killed Osama bin Laden, international media have covered the raid from virtually every angle. The United States and Pakistan have also squared off over the U.S. violation of Pakistan’s sovereign territory and Pakistan’s possible complicity in hiding the al Qaeda leader. All this surface-level discussion, however, largely ignores almost 10 years of intelligence development in the hunt for bin Laden.

While the cross-border nighttime raid deep into Pakistan was a daring and daunting operation, the work to find the target — one person out of 180 million in a country full of insurgent groups and a population hostile to American activities on its soil — was a far greater challenge. For the other side, the challenge of hiding the world’s most wanted man from the world’s most funded intelligence apparatus created a clandestine shell game that probably involved current or former Pakistani intelligence officers as well as competing intelligence services. The details of this struggle will likely remain classified for decades.

Examining the hunt for bin Laden is also difficult, mainly because of the sensitivity of the mission and the possibility that some of the public information now available could be disinformation intended to disguise intelligence sources and methods. Successful operations can often compromise human sources and new intelligence technologies that have taken years to develop. Because of this, it is not uncommon for intelligence services to try to create a wilderness of mirrors to protect sources and methods. But using open-source reporting and human intelligence from STRATFOR’s own sources, we can assemble enough information to draw some conclusions about this complex intelligence effort and raise some key questions. Continue Reading →

U.S.: Bin Laden Compound Was Command Center

STRATFOR

May 7, 2011
Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani compound was an active command center from which he directed al Qaeda, according to a senior U.S. intelligence official as he released videos May 7 showing bin Laden watching himself on tape and rehearsing speeches, Reuters reported. Bin Laden was a strategic thinker active in operational planning and tactical decision-making and was interested in continued U.S. attacks, the official stated. Bin Laden’s body was confirmed using identification by a woman at the compound, facial recognition methods and matching against a DNA profile with a likelihood of error of only 1 in 11.8 quadrillion, the official said.

Dispatch: Jihadist Groups After bin Laden’s Death

From STRATFOR:

Video here:

Vice President of Tactical Intelligence Scott Stewart discusses some of the al Qaeda franchise groups and other jihadist threats following the death of Osama bin Laden.

Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

In the wake of Osama bin Laden’s death, one of the things it is important to keep in mind is that jihadism is much bigger than just the al Qaeda core group. In fact, over the last several years, we have seen the franchise groups come to eclipse the core group in terms of importance on the physical battlefield and the ideological battlefield.

Many people have been saying, over the last day or so, that they believe jihadist terrorism is dead with the death of bin Laden, and that al Qaeda will be no more. But I think that a thoughtful discussion of this topic needs to look at what al Qaeda is.

At STRATFOR, when we look at jihadism, we see it as a much broader phenomenon than just al Qaeda. In fact, at the apex of the jihadist movement we do have al Qaeda core group. But below that we have a whole array of regional franchise jihadist groups. And further down we have an even broader, diffuse selection of people whom we call grassroots jihadists. Those are people who are radicalized, who have adopted a jihadist ideology but who do not have a real connection to the al Qaeda core or the franchise groups. Continue Reading →

U.S.: Officials Ruled Out Pakistani Help In Bin Laden Operation

below is a SITREP from STRATFOR about the decision not to inform the government of Pakistan about the raid on the Pakistani constructed compound where OBL conducted business. For anyone who finds this interesting (as I do) and want to understand the machinery of the ISI and perhaps more importantly the FBI and other US intel agencies, consider a fantastic lost weekend with the book, ‘Ghost’ by Fred Burton, former DSS agent and current adviser for terrorism at STRATFOR. It is the detailed story of the capture of the people who did the first bombing of the WTC under Bill Clinton. The bombing everyone seems to forget. The DSS captured the principles in this and the main man in Pakistan. The story is not only fantastically entertaining and a great true life adventure read, but is informative as to the way the various agencies operate. Once you have read this book, re read the 911 commision reports or watch the excellent docu-drama, ‘The Path to 911’ with Harvey Keitel which is deadly accurate except in 2 details which the book Ghost will make clear.

Eeyore

From STRATFOR

May 3, 2011
CIA Director Leon Panetta on May 3 said the United States ruled out involving Pakistan in the operation to bring down Osama bin Laden because officials feared Pakistan could jeopardize the mission by leaking information to him, TIME reported. Panetta also said the United States collected an “impressive amount” of material from bin Laden’s compound, including computers and other electronics.

STRATFOR Analysis on the Arab uprisings

The Arab Risings, Israel and Hamas

This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR

April 12, 2011

By George Friedman

There was one striking thing missing from the events in the Middle East in past months: Israel. While certainly mentioned and condemned, none of the demonstrations centered on the issue of Israel. Israel was a side issue for the demonstrators, with the focus being on replacing unpopular rulers.

This is odd. Since even before the creation of the state of Israel, anti-Zionism has been a driving force among the Arab public, perhaps more than it has been with Arab governments. While a few have been willing to develop open diplomatic relations with Israel, many more have maintained informal relations: Numerous Arab governments have been willing to maintain covert relations with Israel, with extensive cooperation on intelligence and related matters. They have been unwilling to incur the displeasure of the Arab masses through open cooperation, however.

That makes it all the more strange that the Arab opposition movements — from Libya to Bahrain — have not made overt and covert cooperation with Israel a central issue, if for no other reason than to mobilize the Arab masses. Let me emphasize that Israel was frequently an issue, but not the central one. If we go far back to the rise of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and his revolution for Pan-Arabism and socialism, his issues against King Farouk were tightly bound with anti-Zionism. Similarly, radical Islamists have always made Israel a central issue, yet it wasn’t there in this round of unrest. This was particularly surprising with regimes like Egypt’s, which had formal relations with Israel.

It is not clear why Israel was not a rallying point. One possible explanation is that the demonstrations in the Islamic world were focused on unpopular leaders and regimes, and the question of local governance was at their heart. That is possible, but particularly as the demonstrations faltered, invoking Israel would have seemed logical as a way to legitimize their cause. Another explanation might have rested in the reason that most of these risings failed, at least to this point, to achieve fundamental change. They were not mass movements involving all classes of society, but to a great extent the young and the better educated. This class was more sophisticated about the world and understood the need for American and European support in the long run; they understood that including Israel in their mix of grievances was likely to reduce Western pressure on the risings’ targets. We know of several leaders of the Egyptian rising, for example, who were close to Hamas yet deliberately chose to downplay their relations. They clearly were intensely anti-Israeli but didn’t want to make this a crucial issue. In the case of Egypt, they didn’t want to alienate the military or the West. They were sophisticated enough to take the matter step by step.

Hamas’ Opportunity
A second thing was missing from the unrest: There was no rising, no intifada, in the Palestinian territories. Given the general unrest sweeping the region, it would seem logical that the Palestinian public would have pressed both the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and Hamas to organize massive demonstrations against Israel. This didn’t happen. Continue Reading →

STRATFOR: Germany: Police Thwart Possible Attack On Soccer Game

Germany: Police Thwart Possible Attack On Soccer Game
March 31, 2011
German police have arrested a 25-year-old man in Cologne suspected of plotting an attack on a top Bundesliga soccer match in Dortmund, DPA reported March 31. During interrogations, the suspect made Islamist statements and said he was planning terrorism attacks, German state TV reported. Police later found three explosive devices at the suspect’s apartment near the soccer stadium in Dortmund. A police spokeswoman confirmed that an investigation is under way in connection with the explosive devices found at the apartment.

STRATFOR: Al Qaeda Deputy Calls For Islamic Rule

Egypt: Al Qaeda Deputy Calls For Islamic Rule
March 4, 2011
Al Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called for the establishment of Islamic rule in Egypt following former President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation, according to an Internet audio recording posted to a jihadist website, Forbes reported March 3. The 28-minute long recording told Egyptians and Tunisians to not let the United States and other foreign nations install puppet regimes and urged Yemenis to continue agitating against Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who he said turned Yemen into an American spy base.

Lebanon: Hezbollah Chief Warns Of Border Clash With Israel

STRATFOR:

February 16, 2011
Hezbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah told the group Feb. 16 in a televised address to be ready to invade northern Israel if ordered to do so, AP reported. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak warned the Israel Defense Forces Northern Command on Feb. 15 that the border could explode into crisis. Nasrallah said Hezbollah should be ready to seize the Galilee area, which refers to part of northern Israel.

2. February 16, 2011
Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah warned Israeli leaders in a televised address on Feb. 16 they should expect reprisal for the death of Imad Mughniyah, a Hezbollah commander killed in February 2008, Reuters reported.

STRATFOR: Iran, U.S.: Obama Encourages Protesters, Criticizes Regime

February 15, 2011 STRATFOR:
The Iranian regime pretends to celebrate events in Egypt while attacking Iranians who attempt to demonstrate peacefully, U.S. President Barack Obama said Feb. 15 at a White House press conference, CNN reported. Obama expressed hope that the Iranian people would continue to protest for more freedom and representation in government with the full knowledge that Washington could no more dictate the outcome there than it could inside Egypt. The United States can give moral support to those seeking a better life, he said

Aftermath: Showing of ‘Iranium’ Clare lopez

This is Clare Lopez after the showing of the film, ‘Iranium’ which took place on Superbowl Sunday, Feb 6 2011. It was a complete sell out with over 50 people being turned back at the door. Minister of heritage, James Moore was there and spoke before the film. I will have that up shortly as well as an interview with a Persian language radio show host here in Canada.

The security for this show was stunning. There were sniffer dogs that went through the whole building before anyone was allowed in. There were police of several kinds in and outside the building. Coat checks and bag checks were mandatory for everyone. People accepted it stoically. Canadians showed real conviction by coming out to this event. I was personally very proud to see so many Canadians coming to this movie. It was an act of defiance uncharacteristic of Canadians as a rule.

Look for much more on this over the next day or so. I will be uploading more footage. Part II of this Q&A is uploaded in this post and other interviews will appear in posts of their own.

I will be uploading part II shortly. Meanwhile, this SITREP just came in from STRATFOR. I thought it was fitting to post it here:

February 7, 2011 STRATFOR:
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps navy commander said Iranian forces would close the Strait of Hormuz if any military action is taken against Iran, Mehr News Agency reported Feb. 7. Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi said Iran is capable of closing the Strait of Hormuz at any time, and that the slightest threatening movement to undermine the security of the region would be met with a very firm response. He said the United States knows it cannot tolerate the repercussions that come with inspecting Iranian ships.