Category Archives: Stratfor

Stratfor: Obama’s first real challenge. really really good read.

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Obama Enters the Great Game www.stratfor.com

January 19, 2009 | 1942 GMT


Graphic for Geopolitical Intelligence Report

By George Friedman

U.S. President-elect Barack Obama will be sworn in on Tuesday as president of the United States. Candidate Obama said much about what he would do as president; now we will see what President Obama actually does. The most important issue Obama will face will be the economy, something he did not anticipate through most of his campaign. The first hundred days of his presidency thus will revolve around getting a stimulus package passed. But Obama also is now in the great game of global competition — and in that game, presidents rarely get to set the agenda.

The major challenge he faces is not Gaza; the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is not one any U.S. president intervenes in unless he wants to experience pain. As we have explained, that is an intractable conflict to which there is no real solution. Certainly, Obama will fight being drawn into mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during his first hundred days in office. He undoubtedly will send the obligatory Middle East envoy, who will spend time with all the parties, make suitable speeches and extract meaningless concessions from all sides. This envoy will establish some sort of process to which everyone will cynically commit, knowing it will go nowhere. Such a mission is not involvement — it is the alternative to involvement, and the reason presidents appoint Middle East envoys. Obama can avoid the Gaza crisis, and he will do so.

Obama’s Two Unavoidable Crises

The two crises that cannot be avoided are Afghanistan and Russia. First, the situation in Afghanistan is tenuous for a number of reasons, and it is not a crisis that Obama can avoid decisions on. Obama has said publicly that he will decrease his commitments in Iraq and increase them in Afghanistan. He thus will have more troops fighting in Afghanistan. The second crisis emerged from a decision by Russia to cut off natural gas to Ukraine, and the resulting decline in natural gas deliveries to Europe. This one obviously does not affect the United States directly, but even after flows are restored, it affects the Europeans greatly. Obama therefore comes into office with three interlocking issues: Afghanistan, Russia and Europe. In one sense, this is a single issue — and it is not one that will wait.

Obama clearly intends to follow Gen. David Petraeus’ lead in Afghanistan. The intention is to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, thereby intensifying pressure on the Taliban and opening the door for negotiations with the militant group or one of its factions. Ultimately, this would see the inclusion of the Taliban or Taliban elements in a coalition government. Petraeus pursued this strategy in Iraq with Sunni insurgents, and it is the likely strategy in Afghanistan.

But the situation in Afghanistan has been complicated by the situation in Pakistan. Roughly three-quarters of U.S. and NATO supplies bound for Afghanistan are delivered to the Pakistani port of Karachi and trucked over the border to Afghanistan. Most fuel used by Western forces in Afghanistan is refined in Pakistan and delivered via the same route. There are two crossing points, one near Afghanistan’s Kandahar province at Chaman, Pakistan, and the other through the Khyber Pass. The Taliban have attacked Western supply depots and convoys, and Pakistan itself closed the routes for several days, citing government operations against radical Islamist forces.

Meanwhile, the situation in Pakistan has been complicated by tensions with India. The Indians have said that the individuals who carried out the Nov. 26 Mumbai attack were Pakistanis supported by elements in the Pakistani government. After Mumbai, India made demands of the Pakistanis. While the situation appears to have calmed, the future of Indo-Pakistani relations remains far from clear; anything from a change of policy in New Delhi to new terrorist attacks could see the situation escalate. The Pakistanis have made it clear that a heightened threat from India requires them to shift troops away from the Afghan border and toward the east; a small number of troops already has been shifted.

Apart from the direct impact this kind of Pakistani troop withdrawal would have on cross-border operations by the Taliban, such a move also would dramatically increase the vulnerability of NATO supply lines through Pakistan. Some supplies could be shipped in by aircraft, but the vast bulk of supplies — petroleum, ammunition, etc. — must come in via surface transit, either by truck, rail or ship. Western operations in Afghanistan simply cannot be supplied from the air alone. A cutoff of the supply lines across Pakistan would thus leave U.S. troops in Afghanistan in crisis. Because Washington can’t predict or control the future actions of Pakistan, of India or of terrorists, the United States must find an alternative to the routes through Pakistan.

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Stratfor: Chechen murdered in Vienna, a city of political intrigue

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This article was co written by Fred Burton of Stratfor, former DSS agent who authored the most entertaining and informative book ‘Ghost.’ I strongly recommend getting Fred’s book detailing the events of Islamic groups from before the first WTC attack right up to 911 for a really good insight of the people and events involved.

Ghost can be ordered from the store page of this site.

A Killing in Vienna and the Chechen Connection
January 22, 2009

RELATED SPECIAL TOPIC PAGE
Global Organized Crime
By Fred Burton and Ben West

As Umar Israilov, a 27-year-old Chechen political refugee living in Vienna, Austria, returned home on foot after grocery shopping Jan. 13, he spotted two men standing outside his apartment building — one of whom had a gun. Upon spotting the men, Israilov dropped his groceries and fled down Leopoldauer Street in the Floridsdorf neighborhood of Vienna, dodging cars and pedestrians. But the gunman managed to wound Israilov, halting his flight. The two men then approached him in a side alley, where the armed man shot Israilov twice in the head, killing him.

One man has been detained in connection with the killing, which a Stratfor source alleges was carried out by organized criminal assets in Vienna at the behest of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and with Kremlin approval. Israilov was an outspoken critic of Kadyrov and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Because of this, Israilov had frequently expressed concerns for his safety and that of his family.

Before seeking asylum in Austria, Israilov fought during the Second Chechen War against Russian forces, which captured him in 2003. Afterward, he served as one of Kadyrov’s bodyguards, a position that gave him a front-row seat to the activities of Kadyrov, who at that time led the militia of his father, then-Chechen President Akhmed Kadyrov. (Ramzan Kadyrov became Chechen president in 2007, three years after his father’s assassination.) Israilov and the younger Kadyrov had a falling-out in 2004, after which Israilov said his former boss tortured him using electric charges.

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Stratfor: jihadism for 2009

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Jihadism in 2009: The Trends Continue
January 7, 2009

From Stratfor:

By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

RELATED SPECIAL TOPIC PAGE
The Devolution of Al Qaeda
For the past several years, we have published an annual forecast for al Qaeda and the jihadist movement. Since the January 2006 forecast, we have focused heavily on the devolution of jihadism from a phenomenon focused primarily on al Qaeda the group to one based primarily on al Qaeda the movement. Last year, we argued that al Qaeda was struggling to remain relevant and that al Qaeda prime had been marginalized in the physical battlefield. This marginalization of al Qaeda prime had caused that group to forfeit its position at the vanguard of the physical jihad, though it remained deeply involved in the leadership of the ideological battle.

As a quick reminder, Stratfor views what most people refer to as “al Qaeda” as a global jihadist network rather than a monolithic entity. This network consists of three distinct entities. The first is a core vanguard, which we frequently refer to as al Qaeda prime, comprising Osama bin Laden and his trusted associates. The second is composed of al Qaeda franchise groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq, and the third comprises the grassroots jihadist movement inspired by al Qaeda prime and the franchise groups.

As indicated by the title of this forecast, we believe that the trends we have discussed in previous years will continue, and that al Qaeda prime has become marginalized on the physical battlefield to the extent that we have not even mentioned their name in the title. The regional jihadist franchises and grassroots operatives pose a much more significant threat in terms of security concerns, though it is important to note that those concerns will remain tactical and not rise to the level of a strategic threat. In our view, the sort of strategic challenge that al Qaeda prime posed with the 9/11 attacks simply cannot be replicated without a major change in geopolitical alignments — a change we do not anticipate in 2009.

2008 in Review
Before diving into our forecast for the coming year, let’s take a quick look back at what we said would happen in 2008 and see what we got right and what we did not.

What we got right:

Al Qaeda core focused on the ideological battle. Another year has passed without a physical attack by the al Qaeda core. As we noted last October, al Qaeda spent a tremendous amount of effort in 2008 fighting the ideological battle. The core leadership still appears to be very intent on countering the thoughts presented in a book written in 2007 by Sayyed Imam al-Sharif, also known as Dr. Fadl, an imprisoned Egyptian radical and a founder (with Ayman al-Zawahiri) of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Al-Sharif’s book is seen as such a threat because he provides theological arguments that counter many of the core teachings used by al Qaeda to justify jihadism. On Dec. 13, an 85-page treatise by one of al Qaeda’s leading religious authorities, Abu-Yahya al-Libi, was released to jihadist Web sites in the latest of al Qaeda’s many efforts to counter Dr. Fadl’s arguments.

Pakistan will be important as a potential flashpoint. Eight days after we wrote this, former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated. Since then, Pakistan has become the focal point on the physical battlefield.
The November 2007 addition of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) to the global jihadist network will not pose a serious threat to the Libyan regime. The Libyans have deftly used a combination of carrots and sticks to divide and control the LIFG.
Jihadists will kill more people with explosives and firearms than with chemical, biological or radiological weapons. We saw no jihadist attacks using WMD in 2008.

What we got mostly right:

The Algerian jihadist franchise, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), will be hard-pressed in 2008, but not eliminated. AQIM succeeded in launching a large number of attacks in the first eight months of 2008, killing as many people as it did in all of 2007. But since then, the Algerian government has been making progress, and the jihadist group has only conducted two attacks since August 2008. The Algerians also are working closely with neighboring countries to combat AQIM, and the group is definitely feeling the heat. On Dec. 23, 2008, the Algerian government reportedly rejected a truce offered by AQIM leader Yahia Djouadi. Djouadi offered that al Qaeda would cease attacks on foreigners operating in oil fields in Algeria and Mauritania if the Algerian security service would cease targeting al Qaeda members in the Sahel region. The group is still alive, and government pressure appears to have affected its operational ability in recent months, but it did take a bit longer than we anticipated for the pressure to make a difference.
Syria will use Fatah al-Islam as a destabilizing force in Lebanon. We had intelligence last year suggesting that the Syrians were going to press the use of their jihadist proxies in Lebanon — specifically Fatah al-Islam. We saw a bit of this type of activity in late May, but not as much as anticipated. By November, Syria actually decided to cut ties with Fatah al-Islam.
Jihadist operatives outside war zones will focus on soft targets. Major terrorist strikes in Islamabad and New Delhi were conducted against hotels, soft targets Stratfor has focused on as vulnerable for many years now. Other attacks in India focused on markets and other public places. While most of the attacks against hard targets came in war zones like Iraq and Afghanistan, there were a few attacks against hard targets in places like Pakistan, Yemen and Turkey. Granted, the Sanaa and Istanbul attacks were unsuccessful, but they were attacks against hard targets nonetheless.

What we missed:

The jihadist franchises in Yemen resurged, and the al-Shabab in Somalia found success. While we quickly picked up on these trends in April and May respectively (and beat most others to the punch with some very good analysis on these topics), we clearly did not predict them in December 2007. We knew that the influx of fighters from Iraq was going to impact countries in the region, but we didn’t specifically focus on Yemen and Somalia.
The Year Ahead
We anticipate that we will see the United States continue its campaign of decapitation strikes against al Qaeda leadership. While this campaign has not managed to get bin Laden or al-Zawahiri, it has proved quite successful at causing the al Qaeda apex leadership to lie low and become marginalized from the physical jihad. The campaign also has killed a long list of key al Qaeda operational commanders and trainers. As noted above, we believe the core leadership is very concerned about the ideological battle being waged against it — the only real way the theology of jihadism can be defeated — and will continue to focus their efforts on that battlespace.

As long as the ideology of jihadism survives (it has been around since the late 1980s), the jihadists’ war against the world will continue. It will continue to oscillate between periods of high and low intensity. In the coming year, we believe the bulk of physical attacks will continue to be conducted by regional jihadist franchise groups, and to a lesser extent by grassroots jihadists.

With the lack of regional franchises in North America, we do not see a strategic threat to the United States. However, as seen by the recent convictions in the Fort Dix plot trial, or even in the late October case where a U.S. citizen apparently committed a suicide bombing on behalf of al-Shabab in Somalia, the threat of simple attacks against soft targets in the United States remains. We were again surprised that no jihadist attacks occurred in the United States in 2008. Given the vulnerabilities that exist in an open society and the ease of attack, we cannot rule out an attack in 2009.

In Europe, where AQIM and other jihadist franchises have a greater presence and infrastructure, there is a greater threat that these franchises will commit sophisticated attacks. It must be recognized, though, that they will have a far harder time acquiring weapons and explosives to conduct such attacks in the United Kingdom or France than they would in Algeria or Pakistan. Because of this, we anticipate that they will continue to focus on soft targets in Europe. Due to differences between the Muslim communities in the United States and Europe, the grassroots operatives have been more active in Europe than they are in the United States. The May 22, 2008, attempted bombing at the Giraffe Cafe by a Muslim convert in Exeter serves as a good reminder of this.

Jihadist Franchises
After failing last year to predict the resurgence of the jihadist franchises in Yemen and Somalia, we will be keeping a sharp eye on both for 2009. Somalia continues to be a basket case of a country, and the instability there is providing an opportunity for al-Shabab to flourish. There is currently an attempt under way to bring stability to Somalia, but we anticipate that it will not succeed, due to the militant factionalism in the country. The only thing working against al-Shabab and their jihadist brethren is that the Somalian jihadists appear to be as fractious as the rest of the country; al-Shabab is itself a splinter of the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC), which ruled Somalia briefly before the Ethiopian invasion in 2006. There are currently as many as four different jihadist factions fighting one another for control over various areas of Somalia — in addition to fighting foreign troops and the interim government.

In Yemen, things have been eerily quiet since the Sept. 17 attack against the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa and the government campaign to go after the group behind that attack. Six gunmen were killed in the attack itself, and the Yemenis have arrested numerous others whom they claim were involved in planning the attack. The Yemenis also killed or captured several significant jihadists prior to the September attack. But given the large number of Yemenis involved in the fighting in Iraq, the number of Saudi militants who have traveled to Yemen due to pressure at home, and the Salafist-jihadist influence within Yemen’s security and intelligence apparatus, it will be possible for the two jihadist franchises in Yemen to recover if the Yemenis give them breathing space.

Meanwhile, though Iraq is far calmer than it was a few years back, a resurgence in jihadist activity is possible. One of the keys to calming down the many jihadist groups in Iraq was the formation of the Awakening Councils, which are made up of many Sunni former Baathist (and some jihadist) militants placed on the U.S. payroll. With the changes in Iraq, responsibility for these Awakening Councils has been passed to the Iraqi government. If the Shiite-dominated government decides not to pay the councils, many of the militants-turned-security officers might return to their old ways — especially if the pay from jihadist groups is right. Intelligence reports indicate that Baghdad plans to pay only a fraction of the approximately 100,000 men currently serving in the Awakening Councils. The Iraqi central government apparently plans to offer the bulk of them civilian jobs or job training, but we are skeptical that this will work.

Elsewhere, Pakistan is once again the critical location for the jihadists. Not only is Pakistan the home of the al Qaeda core leadership as its pursues its ideological war, it also is home to a number of jihadist groups, from the Afghan Taliban and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in the northwest to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed in the northeast, among several others. The coming year might prove to be pivotal in global efforts against the jihadists in Pakistan. Pakistan already is a country in crisis, and in some ways it is hard to imagine it getting much worse. But if Pakistan continues to destabilize, it could very well turn into a failed country (albeit a failed country with a nuclear arsenal). Before Pakistan becomes a failed state, there are a number of precursor stages it probably will pass through. The most immediate stage would entail the fall of most of the North-West Frontier Province to the jihadists, something that could happen this year.

This type of anarchy in Pakistan could give the jihadists an opportunity to exert control in a way similar to what they have done in places like Afghanistan and Somalia (and already in the Pakistani badlands along the Afghan border.) If, on the other hand, Pakistan is somehow able to hold on, re-establish control over its territory and its rogue intelligence agency and begin to cooperate with the United States and other countries fighting the jihadists, such a development could deal a terrible blow to the aspirations of the jihadists on both the physical and ideological battlefields. Given the number of plots linked to Pakistan in recent years, including the Nov. 26 Mumbai attack and almost every significant plot since 9/11, all eyes will be watching Pakistan carefully.

Hamas threatens Jews and Jewish children everywhere. Again. Somehow more seriously.

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According to Stratfor, Israeli news quoted Palestinian TV saying that Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar is calling on militants to attack Israeli businesses and civilians and institutions. This is a puzzling report. In what way is this call any different from the usual call to destroy anything Israeli? Could this mean extra nationally? Jews and anything percieved to be connected to Jews world wide? Surely this call would not have been made unless it was somehow different than actual Hamas policy.

Then we have this:

From Jihad Watch,

As fighting intensified on the northern outskirts of Gaza City today, a top Hamas leader broke cover to warn Israel that the Islamists would kill Jewish children anywhere in the world in revenge for their own young who have died in the devastating assault.“They have legitimised the murder of their own children by killing the children of Palestine,” said Mahmoud Zahar, in a televised broadcast recorded at a secret location. “They have legitimised the killing of their people all over the world by killing our people.”

Mr Zahar, a hard-line political leader, made his first appearance since Israeli launched its offensive against his organisation. Dressed in a dark suit and as he read the statement, he declared “Victory is coming, God willing.”

I gotta tell ya, I would be hard pressed to know the difference between this policy and business as usual for Islamic terrorists. It seems to me they do as much as they can pretty much all the time.

A short and incomplete (growing) list of links of attacks on Jews and perceived Israeli interests.

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Jewish-French philosopher Bernard Henri-Levy was listed by a Belgium-based Islamist group as a target for assassination alongside other leading Jewish personalities in Europe, the Belgian daily La Derniere Heure reported earlier this week.

This is what I was expecting. The excuse by Islamists to start attacking Jewish people which may or may not have any affiliation connection or even sympathy with Israel. The equivalent on the other side might be Israeli org.s targeting Arabs irrespective of their actual beliefs religion or politics. This needs to be understood. Ultimately the Islamist acts are anti semitic and the politics of Israel are really quite irrelevant other than Islam cannot tolerate an autonomous zone within the Islamic world governed by other than Islam.

Here is a link to a video of a protest by pro Hamas supporters in Ft. Lauderdale Florida. While I dislike the idea of extrapolating from one ignorant girl who shouts “Jews go back to the ovens. What you need is a big Oven!” It doesnt seem to be out of context in terms of the wider Islamic world especially perhaps in Iran where holocaust denial is a state sponsored thing while they clearly are planning the next one. Even so protest is protest and Im all for it. I do love that the USA will use its police to protect protesters no matter how repugnant their messages may be to some of us. It means they will protect us as well. For now.

Muslims shoot two Israeli’s in Denmark mall. I have previously posted this but I want to assemble instances of this in one post to date. I suspect that we can find a multiple of these incidents that we do not know about partially because of the western media in many nations including Canada who have policies of not including the motives for violent attack if that group are Muslims. I have no way of knowing what that multiple would be of course. As the MSM continues to fail us, the best we can do is look at reports and make assumptions about the attackers based on names or any details we can work with. This does a great disservice to us all of course as we may falsely assign motives and come to wrong conclusions. An informed public is a public that makes the best decisions for itself and hiding facts to shape public opinion can never be good. It is what the Islamic world does and very likely why we and they have the problems we do. One can’t help but notice that the internet is very tightly controlled in most Islamic nations.

Molotov Cocktail thrown at Chicago Jewish center. I used the live leak link instead of a newspaper as this link also looks like it has some interesting videos.

Lastly, Stratfor did a rather excellent analysis on why this should not be a great concern. Their reasoning is that attacks of this kind typically take planning resources and thought. So there is little likelyhood of attacks on Jewish targets any more than usual. Not that the threat is not real overall but the frequency and severity of them are not likely to be much greater than average. While this is quite true it depends on the preparedness of various cells in Al Queda’s now inch deep mile wide and whether or not they where waiting for an ‘excuse’ such as this to act. Chances are though we would have seen it by now. Even so events in Gaza could cause this kind of preparation and we may see the results in some weeks or months time in terms of more severe and calculated acts of terror against perceived Israeli or Jewish targets. I will post a paragraph or two of the report within the limits of the copyright.

Since the Gaza operation began Dec. 27, Muslim and anti-Israeli groups have condemned Israel and its allies, and some groups have engaged in protests and violent acts. On Dec. 30, students in Aden, Yemen, stormed the Egyptian consulate, and hundreds of Iranian students occupied a residential compound at the British Embassy in Tehran. They replaced the Union Jack with a Palestinian flag, harkening back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the U.S. hostage crisis. Protests also have taken place at Israeli diplomatic missions.

While this kind of violence and disruption is somewhat expected in the Middle East, attacks like the ones against the Jewish shopkeepers in Denmark and the temple in Chicago are examples of how disturbances in the Middle East can often spread around the world. But there is no reason to believe that these attacks will escalate beyond lone-wolf or small-gang attacks. It is true that groups such as al Qaeda and Hamas and other radical Palestinian militants operate the world over, but mounting a successful major attack requires planning, resources and time. The motivation and even ability to activate those resources in the West is low. Hamas’ international network is primarily a financial one, so attacking the same locations that are sources of much-needed cash is not in the group’s strategic interest. Iran has plenty of its own differences with Israel, but it will not change its strategy toward Israel because of the Palestinians. Similarly, al Qaeda (with its core on the decline) has often used the Palestinian issue in its anti-Western rhetoric, but has yet to conduct an attack directly in support of the Palestinians. In al Qaeda’s heyday, its attacks were strategic in nature and took years to prepare — it will not go off half-cocked with 50,000 NATO troops searching for militants in Afghanistan.

Stratfor.com is a paid geopolitical think tank site and it’s well worth subscribing to read the whole report. They get a lot right. But given that Hizbolah, Iran’s proxy army has caused the issuance of many security alerts by various nations in the past five years warning about impending attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets it’s difficult not to see how the current war between Hamas in Gaza and Israel would not be a cause of escalation for them especially as Iran is demanding that the Arab world react.

‘Pro Palistinian’ gang attacks Jewish area of UK

January 2, 2009

A gang of pro-Palestinian demonstrators rampaged through the heart of the Jewish community on Wednesday evening, attacking businesses and assaulting a motorist.


I will add links to this post as I find them. Worth watching Scandinavian and Dutch news as well as UK.



India Pakistan Mumbai and the rhetoric from both sides.

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The likelihood of a military action by Pakistan seems higher each day in this complex and escalating situation between these two nuclear neighbors.

To begin with, Pakistan is not a country in the usual sense while India is. Specifically Pakistan doesn’t seem to have branches of the state controlled by a central government. The organizations likely responsible for the series of brutal attacks on India through bombings in its financial district and shopping areas and so on, organizations such as the ISI (Pakistan’s intelligence coordinating agency or Inter Services Intelligence) do not seem to answer to the government of Pakistan. This leads to India’s dilemma…

Does the government of Pakistan actually encourage the ISI and other branches of the Pakistani military to conduct terrorist attacks on India? If so they are at war but the government is merely hiding behind the excuse of terrorism to abdicate direct responsability for the attacks.

Does the government not sponsor these attacks but is unable to control those branches of the state which at the moment clearly appear to be responsible for the attacks? If so then India would have less reason to attack the government but would still feel the need to deal militarily with the offices and facilities of the organizations which appear to have trained equipped and planned the missions to attack India.

Is Pakistan basically a failed state and each organization is working to its own agenda and there is no central body which can be said to have authority over the actions of the Pakistani Military? essentially this is the same as the paragraph above except for a matter of degree. The following video of Taliban-Al Queda offering to support the army of Pakistan with suicide bombers should the enemy be India does speak to who the likely allies are who are attacking India. Chances are that a large percentage of the ISI and other Pakistani agencies are working with the Muslim extremists and it can be argued that the taliban in some ways are the true government.

[kaltura-widget wid=”ukjbuj4sdg” width=”410″ height=”364″ addpermission=”3″ editpermission=”3″ /]It is worth noting that this video was broadcast on Indian mass media and available on the Times of India web site. This alone means the level of jingoism in the popular press in India is elevating putting pressure on India to take convincing action against Pakistan in some ways.

Stratfor makes the case that the Indian government which is dovish is weak and that if it fails to act will fail leading to a new Indian Government which is overtly hawkish. While its true that typically a hawkish party often softens its tone once it’s in actual power not acting is guaranteed to cause continued terrorist attacks in India and a growing loss of confidence in the governments ability to protect the interests and safety of the people of India.

The Times of India also broadcast this video about the identity of the one surviving terrorist in the Mumbai attacks as being Pakistani. As you will see, the Pakistani official government denies what is presented as clear evidence of Pakistani origins and support for his mission.

[kaltura-widget wid=”dmj2sa02zs” width=”410″ height=”364″ addpermission=”3″ editpermission=”3″ /]

All in all it would appear that the media is setting up the people of India for a military action of some kind on Pakistan. Its well worth reading the various Stratfor analysis of this situation available here on Vlad. Ill post some of the links at the bottom of this article. Add to this rumors of troop buildups along the India side of the India Pakistani border and higher military alert levels as well as Pakistani air force missions flying along the India border at increased frequency and for previously not done surveillance and it would appear that both sides are anticipating some military events.

This does not mean a war necessarily. It could be as little as Indian air strikes on the same target areas the US is conducting in lawless areas of Pakistan where the Taliban and Al Queda are based and operating from. It could also mean strikes against ISI facilities however within Pakistan proper and or training facilities for the Pakistani military where rumor has it the terrorists were prepared for the Mumbai attacks. This would certainly lead to escalation though and even the Government of Pakistan would have to take an official position against the Indian attacks no matter how justified.

Stratfor on India Pakistan situation.

Stratfor: On the crisis in journalism. A great read.

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Obviously it worth considering the role media played in the last US election as well as the Iraq war (The CIA used the New York Times to try and destroy Bush by leaking secret plans for the Iraq war which did not involve the CIA in the way they wanted) when reading this as usual excellent bit of analysis by the people at Stratfor.

Eeyore for Vlad
The Death of Deep Throat and the Crisis of Journalism
December 22, 2008

By George Friedman

Mark Felt died last week at the age of 95. For those who don’t recognize that name, Felt was the “Deep Throat” of Watergate fame. It was Felt who provided Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein of The Washington Post with a flow of leaks about what had happened, how it happened and where to look for further corroboration on the break-in, the cover-up, and the financing of wrongdoing in the Nixon administration. Woodward and Bernstein’s exposé of Watergate has been seen as a high point of journalism, and their unwillingness to reveal Felt’s identity until he revealed it himself three years ago has been seen as symbolic of the moral rectitude demanded of journalists.

In reality, the revelation of who Felt was raised serious questions about the accomplishments of Woodward and Bernstein, the actual price we all pay for journalistic ethics, and how for many years we did not know a critical dimension of the Watergate crisis. At a time when newspapers are in financial crisis and journalism is facing serious existential issues, Watergate always has been held up as a symbol of what journalism means for a democracy, revealing truths that others were unwilling to uncover and grapple with. There is truth to this vision of journalism, but there is also a deep ambiguity, all built around Felt’s role. This is therefore not an excursion into ancient history, but a consideration of two things. The first is how journalists become tools of various factions in political disputes. The second is the relationship between security and intelligence organizations and governments in a Democratic society.

Watergate was about the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington. The break-in was carried out by a group of former CIA operatives controlled by individuals leading back to the White House. It was never proven that then-U.S. President Richard Nixon knew of the break-in, but we find it difficult to imagine that he didn’t. In any case, the issue went beyond the break-in. It went to the cover-up of the break-in and, more importantly, to the uses of money that financed the break-in and other activities. Numerous aides, including the attorney general of the United States, went to prison. Woodward and Bernstein, and their newspaper, The Washington Post, aggressively pursued the story from the summer of 1972 until Nixon’s resignation. The episode has been seen as one of journalism’s finest moments. It may have been, but that cannot be concluded until we consider Deep Throat more carefully.

Deep Throat Reconsidered
Mark Felt was deputy associate director of the FBI (No. 3 in bureau hierarchy) in May 1972, when longtime FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover died. Upon Hoover’s death, Felt was second to Clyde Tolson, the longtime deputy and close friend to Hoover who by then was in failing health himself. Days after Hoover’s death, Tolson left the bureau.

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Stratfor: on India Pakistan and Mumbai. an analysis of probable retaliation

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Next Steps in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis

December 8, 2008 | 1923 GMT


Graphic for Geopolitical Intelligence Report

By George Friedman

Related Special Topic Page

In an interview published this Sunday in The New York Times, we laid out a potential scenario for the current Indo-Pakistani crisis. We began with an Indian strike on Pakistan, precipitating a withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Afghan border, resulting in intensified Taliban activity along the border and a deterioration in the U.S. position in Afghanistan, all culminating in an emboldened Iran. The scenario is not unlikely, assuming India chooses to strike.

Our argument that India is likely to strike focused, among other points, on the weakness of the current Indian government and how it is likely to fall under pressure from the opposition and the public if it does not act decisively. An unnamed Turkish diplomat involved in trying to mediate the dispute has argued that saving a government is not a good reason to go to war. That is a good argument, except that in this case, not saving the government is unlikely to prevent a war, either.

If India’s Congress party government were to fall, its replacement would be even more likely to strike at Pakistan. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Congress’ Hindu nationalist rival, has long charged that Congress is insufficiently aggressive in combating terrorism. The BJP will argue that the Mumbai attack in part resulted from this failing. Therefore, if the Congress government does not strike, and is subsequently forced out or loses India’s upcoming elections, the new government is even more likely to strike.

It is therefore difficult to see a path that avoids Indian retaliation, and thus the emergence of at least a variation on the scenario we laid out. But the problem is not simply political: India must also do something to prevent more Mumbais. This is an issue of Indian national security, and the pressure on India’s government to do something comes from several directions.

Three Indian Views of Pakistan

The question is what an Indian strike against Pakistan, beyond placating domestic public opinion, would achieve. There are three views on this in India.

The first view holds that Pakistani officials aid and abet terrorism — in particular the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), which serves as Pakistan’s main intelligence service. In this view, the terrorist attacks are the work of Pakistani government officials — perhaps not all of the government, but enough officials of sufficient power that the rest of the government cannot block them, and therefore the entire Pakistani government can be held accountable.

The second view holds that terrorist attacks are being carried out by Kashmiri groups that have long been fostered by the ISI but have grown increasingly autonomous since 2002 — and that the Pakistani government has deliberately failed to suppress anti-Indian operations by these groups. In this view, the ISI and related groups are either aware of these activities or willfully ignorant of them, even if ISI is not in direct control. Under this thinking, the ISI and the Pakistanis are responsible by omission, if not by commission.

The third view holds that the Pakistani government is so fragmented and weak that it has essentially lost control of Pakistan to the extent that it cannot suppress these anti-Indian groups. This view says that the army has lost control of the situation to the point where many from within the military-intelligence establishment are running rogue operations, and groups in various parts of the country simply do what they want. If this argument is pushed to its logical conclusion, Pakistan should be regarded as a state on the verge of failure, and an attack by India might precipitate further weakening, freeing radical Islamist groups from what little control there is.

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Mexican kidnapping expert kidnapped in Mexico.

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According to Stratfor (an excellent source of geopolitical non partizan information) …

Mexican government officials confirmed Dec. 15 that U.S. anti-kidnapping consultant Felix Batista was abducted Dec. 10 in the northern city of Saltillo, Coahuila state. According to local press reports, Batista had traveled to Coahuila at the invitation of state law enforcement agencies to deliver a series of presentations to police and businesses on anti-kidnapping strategies. He reportedly was abducted after receiving a cell phone call which prompted him to leave the restaurant where he was dining with a businessman. According to one report, the phone call was from a local security colleague. When he stepped outside, a group of men who had been waiting for Batista ushered him into a vehicle and drove off.

The story of course is quite important in terms of the extent to which Mexico is nearly a failed state. But I had to post it on irony alone. Even so for geopolitics watchers I would investigate the number of murders and gang activity in Mexico. In the past year the number of government officials who have been murdered by drug cartels makes it the logical choice to be corrupt. This would appear to me as the last stage before a truly failed state. One where the various institutions of the state not only cannot act in accordance with their various mandates, but in fact subvert these institutions to act against them.

“trying to control stray dogs by neutering veterinarians” Canada’s National Post on Mumbai

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George Jonas is one of Canada’s truly bright lights in journalism. He really calls it in this article in Canada’s National Post, arguably the only major newspaper in Canada that isn’t trying to sell Canada’s ‘official mandatory culture’. Before I post this article there is a development that I think needs to be reported. India was accused of violating Pakistani air space twice today, December 12th in two separate areas of the Pakistani Indian border. Pakistan has downplayed the incident but India is denying it took place. this is likely pressure by India on its nuclear neighbor Pakistan because the token arrests and changes in policy towards terrorist groups are never enforced for long. Terrorists who are arrested for crimes against India etc. are released as soon as no one is looking and the incarceration usually looks more like Club Med than Club Fed.

from Stratfor:

Stratfor sources have said that Pakistan, under pressure from both India and the United States, has removed several dozen operatives from Inter-Services Intelligence. However, Islamabad has refused to hand over any Pakistani nationals to India. Furthermore, India does not trust that Pakistan is willing and/or able to rein in militant Islamists. This is because Islamabad has arrested such actors and banned militant Islamist groups in the past, only to allow them return to business as usual.

This situation, along with domestic pressure, is forcing the Indian government’s hand and pushing it toward taking unilateral military action against Pakistani-based militants. That said, New Delhi is concerned that any conflict with Pakistan could worsen security for India and in the broader region. Trying to balance between the need to act and the need to exercise caution, New Delhi likely ordered the incursions as a means to sustain the pressure to shape Pakistani behavior

Lastly I would like to add that Pamela Geller’s speculation, which is in no way confirmed, that the police in Mumbai who had a clear shot at a terrorist and did not take it (this much is true) were Muslims may factor in to the severity of the Mumbai attacks. I would very much like to know if its true. If it is, it only makes the point in the article below more valid.

On to the Jonas article…

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Stratfor: analysis and comparison, New York and Mumbai. Superb.

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Once again the boys at Stratfor do an excellent analysis and determine the likely source of the plan used at Mumbai. For more on Ramsey Yussef, I reccomend highly Fred Burton’s book, ‘Ghost’ available through the store here at Vlad Tepes.

Its an account of his capture among other events in counter terrorism and Fred Burton is also the author of this article.

The film ‘The Path to 911’ made as a miniseries by ABC (if you can get the version with the scenes Bill Clinton forced to be deleted put back in and intact) as also an amazing documentary about how this and other terrorist activities are organized and how 911 eventually succeeded.

Eeyore for Vlad.

India flag at half mast in Ottawa after the Mumbai attacks

India flag at half mast in Ottawa after the Mumbai attacks

From the New York Landmarks Plot to the Mumbai Attack
December 3, 2008

By Fred Burton and Ben Wes

RELATED SPECIAL TOPIC PAGES
Militant Attacks In Mumbai and Their Consequences
Travel Security
Terrorist Attack Cycle
On the surface, last week’s attack on Mumbai was remarkable for its execution and apparently unconventional tactics. But when compared to a plot uncovered 15 years ago that targeted prominent hotels in Manhattan, it becomes apparent that the Mumbai attack was not so original after all.

The 1993 New York Landmarks Plot
In July 1993, U.S. counterterrorism agents arrested eight individuals later convicted of plotting an elaborate, multistage attack on key sites in Manhattan. The militants, who were linked to Osama bin Laden’s then-relatively new group, al Qaeda, planned to storm the island armed with automatic rifles, grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In multiple raids on key targets combined with diversionary attacks, they aimed to kill as many people as possible.

The planned attack, which came to be known as the “Landmarks” plot, called for several tactical teams to raid sites such as the Waldorf-Astoria, St. Regis and U.N. Plaza hotels, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, and a midtown Manhattan waterfront heliport servicing business executives and VIPs traveling from lower Manhattan to various New York-area airports. The militants carried out extensive surveillance both inside and outside the target hotels using human probes, hand-drawn maps and video surveillance. Detailed notes were taken on the layout and design of the buildings, with stairwells, ballrooms, security cameras and personnel all reconnoitered.

The attackers intended to infiltrate the hotels and disguise themselves as kitchen employees. On the day of the attack, one attack team planned to use stolen delivery vans to get close to the hotels, at which point heavily armed, small-cell commando teams would deploy from the rear of the van. Stationary operatives would use hand grenades to create diversions while attack teams would rake hotel guests with automatic weapons. The attackers planned to carry gas masks and use tear gas in hotel ballrooms to gain an advantage over any security they might come up against. They planned to attack at night, when the level of protection would be lower.

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Stratfor: an analysis on motives for the Mumbai attacks. as usual, superb thought by Friedman

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Strategic Motivations for the Mumbai Attack
December 1, 2008

By George Friedman

RELATED SPECIAL TOPIC PAGE
Militant Attacks In Mumbai and Their Consequences
Last Wednesday evening, a group of Islamist operatives carried out a complex terror operation in the Indian city of Mumbai. The attack was not complex because of the weapons used or its size, but in the apparent training, multiple methods of approaching the city and excellent operational security and discipline in the final phases of the operation, when the last remaining attackers held out in the Taj Mahal hotel for several days. The operational goal of the attack clearly was to cause as many casualties as possible, particularly among Jews and well-to-do guests of five-star hotels. But attacks on various other targets, from railroad stations to hospitals, indicate that the more general purpose was to spread terror in a major Indian city.

While it is not clear precisely who carried out the Mumbai attack, two separate units apparently were involved. One group, possibly consisting of Indian Muslims, was established in Mumbai ahead of the attacks. The second group appears to have just arrived. It traveled via ship from Karachi, Pakistan, later hijacked a small Indian vessel to get past Indian coastal patrols, and ultimately landed near Mumbai.

Extensive preparations apparently had been made, including surveillance of the targets. So while the precise number of attackers remains unclear, the attack clearly was well-planned and well-executed.

Evidence and logic suggest that radical Pakistani Islamists carried out the attack. These groups have a highly complex and deliberately amorphous structure. Rather than being centrally controlled, ad hoc teams are created with links to one or more groups. Conceivably, they might have lacked links to any group, but this is hard to believe. Too much planning and training were involved in this attack for it to have been conceived by a bunch of guys in a garage. While precisely which radical Pakistani Islamist group or groups were involved is unknown, the Mumbai attack appears to have originated in Pakistan. It could have been linked to al Qaeda prime or its various franchises and/or to Kashmiri insurgents.

More important than the question of the exact group that carried out the attack, however, is the attackers’ strategic end. There is a tendency to regard terror attacks as ends in themselves, carried out simply for the sake of spreading terror. In the highly politicized atmosphere of Pakistan’s radical Islamist factions, however, terror frequently has a more sophisticated and strategic purpose. Whoever invested the time and took the risk in organizing this attack had a reason to do so. Let’s work backward to that reason by examining the logical outcomes following this attack.

An End to New Delhi’s Restraint
The most striking aspect of the Mumbai attack is the challenge it presents to the Indian government — a challenge almost impossible for New Delhi to ignore. A December 2001 Islamist attack on the Indian parliament triggered an intense confrontation between India and Pakistan. Since then, New Delhi has not responded in a dramatic fashion to numerous Islamist attacks against India that were traceable to Pakistan. The Mumbai attack, by contrast, aimed to force a response from New Delhi by being so grievous that any Indian government showing only a muted reaction to it would fall.

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*** Pakistan army violates ceasefire for second time ***

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According to Stratfor.com premiere geopolitical think tank Pakistan has violated a ceasefire with India for the second time within 24 hours. India apparently did not return fire.

The Indian army officer who reported this in the Press Trust of India claimed it was the second breach of the ceasefire within 24 hours and took place across two states.

It’s quite remarkable how hard it is to start a war with Buddhists and Hindu’s isn’t it? But that is clearly what Pakistan’s ISI is determined to do. Islam will not rest till it has destroyed both nations. They may get their wish soon.

Mumbai. India’s 911 with profound condolences to the good people of India

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Thursday 6:23 PM EST dead 125 injured 325

Hard to write anything about what is a world shaking atrocity. I’m not sure short of a WMD what could be worse than a bunch of armed men shooting up hotels, hospitals for women and children, a Jewish community center where they are killing the Jews, hotels of historic importance and full of people being firebombed and people shot seemingly indiscriminately. These videos show a lot of whats going on and I will publish below an outline of Stratfor’s analysis of it to the extent their IP rules allow.

Here is a phone number for US citizens to find out about people in Mumbai 888 407 4747 (Thanks Wendy)

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from Stratfor:

“A massive and well-organized attack by militants in Mumbai, India, has left nearly 100 people dead so far, promises to cut deeply into India’s foreign investment prospects and threatens to rock India’s government. As India responds to the attack, its relationship with Pakistan will be front and center, and the potential for a destabilization of relations between the two geopolitical rivals is high.”

Stratfor focuses on the possible geopolitical ramifications of an already unstable India with a great deal of pressure on its government to react to a string of terrorist attacks from bombings in its commercial centers to shopping districts in the past months.

The group now perpetrating the attacks have a new name but are likely just the usual Pakistani ISI supplied (note the use of military explosives not typically available except through an agency like the ISI) usual Islamist suspects.

from Stratfor:

“Tactical Situation

The crisis is still in full swing with reports indicating that, along with earlier attacks carried out by gunmen on Mumbai’s central train station, a popular cafe and a theater, hostage situations have developed in two of the city’s most prestigious hotels — the Oberoi and the Taj Mahal — as well as in Cama Hospital and the Chabad House, where Jews and Israelis are currently being held hostage. Stratfor sources have said that the attackers approached their targets in boats with Pakistani markings; other sources have said the boats might have been registered in Karachi, Pakistan.”

It would appear that Jewish people are being murdered Chabad House by these attackers.

Potential escalation into war between India and Pakistan is a real possibility because of this. The ISI, Pakistan’s intel service has been accused of being behind a lot of attacks on India and Indian property such as the embassy in Afghanistan. These accusations came from the usually cautious Indian government.

Here is the complete 3rd Stratfor report on this situation which I have received tonight. I strongly recommend reading all of it.

Red Alert: Possible Geopolitical Consequences of the Mumbai Attacks (Open Access)

November 27, 2008 | 0434 GMT

Summary
If the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Islamist militants as it appears, the Indian government will have little choice, politically speaking, but to blame them on Pakistan. That will in turn spark a crisis between the two nuclear rivals that will draw the United States into the fray.

Analysis
RELATED SPECIAL TOPIC PAGE
Militant Attacks In Mumbai and Their Consequences
At this point the situation on the ground in Mumbai remains unclear following the militant attacks of Nov. 26. But in order to understand the geopolitical significance of what is going on, it is necessary to begin looking beyond this event at what will follow. Though the situation is still in motion, the likely consequences of the attack are less murky.

We will begin by assuming that the attackers are Islamist militant groups operating in India, possibly with some level of outside support from Pakistan. We can also see quite clearly that this was a carefully planned, well-executed attack.

Given this, the Indian government has two choices. First, it can simply say that the perpetrators are a domestic group. In that case, it will be held accountable for a failure of enormous proportions in security and law enforcement. It will be charged with being unable to protect the public. On the other hand, it can link the attack to an outside power: Pakistan. In that case it can hold a nation-state responsible for the attack, and can use the crisis atmosphere to strengthen the government’s internal position by invoking nationalism. Politically this is a much preferable outcome for the Indian government, and so it is the most likely course of action. This is not to say that there are no outside powers involved — simply that, regardless of the ground truth, the Indian government will claim there were.

That, in turn, will plunge India and Pakistan into the worst crisis they have had since 2002. If the Pakistanis are understood to be responsible for the attack, then the Indians must hold them responsible, and that means they will have to take action in retaliation — otherwise, the Indian government’s domestic credibility will plunge. The shape of the crisis, then, will consist of demands that the Pakistanis take immediate steps to suppress Islamist radicals across the board, but particularly in Kashmir. New Delhi will demand that this action be immediate and public. This demand will come parallel to U.S. demands for the same actions, and threats by incoming U.S. President Barack Obama to force greater cooperation from Pakistan.

If that happens, Pakistan will find itself in a nutcracker. On the one side, the Indians will be threatening action — deliberately vague but menacing — along with the Americans. This will be even more intense if it turns out, as currently seems likely, that Americans and Europeans were being held hostage (or worse) in the two hotels that were attacked. If the attacks are traced to Pakistan, American demands will escalate well in advance of inauguration day.

There is a precedent for this. In 2002 there was an attack on the Indian parliament in Mumbai by Islamist militants linked to Pakistan. A near-nuclear confrontation took place between India and Pakistan, in which the United States brokered a stand-down in return for intensified Pakistani pressure on the Islamists. The crisis helped redefine the Pakistani position on Islamist radicals in Pakistan.

In the current iteration, the demands will be even more intense. The Indians and Americans will have a joint interest in forcing the Pakistani government to act decisively and immediately. The Pakistani government has warned that such pressure could destabilize Pakistan. The Indians will not be in a position to moderate their position, and the Americans will see the situation as an opportunity to extract major concessions. Thus the crisis will directly intersect U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan.

It is not clear the degree to which the Pakistani government can control the situation. But the Indians will have no choice but to be assertive, and the United States will move along the same line. Whether it is the current government in India that reacts, or one that succeeds doesn’t matter. Either way, India is under enormous pressure to respond. Therefore the events point to a serious crisis not simply between Pakistan and India, but within Pakistan as well, with the government caught between foreign powers and domestic realities. Given the circumstances, massive destabilization is possible — never a good thing with a nuclear power.

This is thinking far ahead of the curve, and is based on an assumption of the truth of something we don’t know for certain yet, which is that the attackers were Muslims and that the Pakistanis will not be able to demonstrate categorically that they weren’t involved. Since we suspect they were Muslims, and since we doubt the Pakistanis can be categorical and convincing enough to thwart Indian demands, we suspect that we will be deep into a crisis within the next few days, very shortly after the situation on the ground clarifies itself.

End of Strafor report.

More links..

Yahoo news

From Ottawa Citizen Thursday Nov 27

MUMBAI – Militants holed up at a Jewish centre in Mumbai, the embattled city where terrorist attacks have killed more than 100 people, have called an Indian television channel to offer talks with the government for the release of hostages.

“Ask the government to talk to us and we will release the hostages,” the man, identified by the India TV channel as Imran, said, speaking in Urdu in what sounded like a Kashmiri accent.

Stratfor: Workplace Violence: Myths and Mitigation

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Workplace Violence: Myths and Mitigation
November 26, 2008

By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

RELATED SPECIAL TOPIC PAGE
Surveillance and Countersurveillance
As the global financial crisis grinds on, it is doing more than generating foreclosures, bankruptcies and losses in the financial markets: It also means people are losing their jobs as many companies cut back on staff in an attempt to stay solvent. Last week, banking giant Citibank announced plans to lay off some 53,000 employees, and Citibank is not alone, as many other companies are being forced to adopt similar measures. These layoffs are not confined to the banking sector; the automotive, computer and transportation sectors have also been hit hard.

As we talk to our friends in corporate security and law enforcement about these layoffs, we are hearing a lot of concern over the fact that the layoffs could spawn incidents of workplace violence. Of course, there is always a risk of such incidents. Indeed, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, out of the 5,488 workplace fatalities in the United States in 2007, there were 610 homicides, of which 491 were shootings. But such concerns are frequently amplified and brought to the forefront during times when there are mass layoffs. (When discussing workplace violence, it is also important to understand that it is not just a U.S. phenomenon. Cases have also occurred in Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Switzerland, Japan, China, India and elsewhere.)

Additionally, workplace violence concerns have been elevated in recent days by the Nov. 14 triple homicide at SiPort, a Silicon Valley semiconductor company. In the SiPort incident, Jing Wu, an engineer who had been fired for performance issues, returned to the company later that day and killed the company’s CEO, vice president of operations and human resources manager. There are reports that Wu had asked for a meeting with the victims to discuss his termination, and had killed them in the meeting.

Workplace Violence Myths
In this environment, we believe it is prudent to explore some of the widespread myths surrounding workplace violence and to discuss some measures that can be taken to help mitigate potential workplace violence incidents.

‘He Just Snapped’

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