SIKH IN FINLAND FORCES BUS COMPANY TO ADHERE TO HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, HE GETS TO WEAR HIS TURBAN

And of course the brainless ombudsman for minorities applauds the decision.

biaudet

My opinion: It’s a private company’s affair, they have a dress code, no one is forcing the man to be a bus driver for that company, he can chose a new work place or follow company rules. Following religious requirements are a duty of the believer, not of the non-believer. The Finnish bus company Veolia, are now subscribing to Sikh beliefs.

sikh headgear ban overturned by finnish administrative agency 28.6.2013

More here.

70 Replies to “SIKH IN FINLAND FORCES BUS COMPANY TO ADHERE TO HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, HE GETS TO WEAR HIS TURBAN”

  1. I fully acknowledge that a democratically elected Parliament of Finland has, after public consultation, enacted laws forbidding arbitrary discrimination by an employer in an employment relationship on a number of specified grounds, and that Veolia may well be in breach of these laws.

    That is all you need to understand the background story to this thread.

    ***

    As for the rest of it, ask yourself what it would take for you to give up your fundamentalist opinion. I personally feel that no philosophy course really delivers the goods unless – at least once – it can give a serious student the experience of abandoning a fundamental conviction that the student previously held to be entirely true. (In my case this was the conviction that logical necessity is a feature of the world)

    To this end:

    1) Examine your understanding of “objectivity”. What is its opposite? What criteria are involved in distinguishing the objective from the non-objective? Is anyone capable of knowing the objective, and if so, then how and to what degree of certainty?

    2) Explore your view of the moral realm. Do you think primarily in terms of “good” or “evil” states of affairs, “ethical” or “unethical” conduct, “duty” and “obligation”, personal “conscience” in specific circumstances, individual “virtue” or “purity”, or some other key aspect of ethics?

    3) Check the responses to (1) and (2) for consistency. If moral values cannot exist without self-aware subjects, then in what sense and to what extent are those values “objective” in the sense that you have chosen?

    4) Review the limits and consistency of your own concrete moral judgements. Trolley problems are an effective instrument for this purpose.

    5) Consider whether moral assertions are possible, and if so then what makes them true or false. Are there any genuine ethical dilemmas or antinomies?

  2. ” do they have the objective right to discriminate, on whatever grounds, or do they not? I claim that they do have this right and that the laws denying them this right, by threat of physical force, are not fully objective, and thus not fully legitimate”

    How else but with the use of physical force is the state going to make a set of laws apply? This is the one method the state employs through out history. The state from time immemorial has the monopoly on violence that is legal, and it is of course violence against its own citizens.When two sets of citizens collide the state steps in and with the backdrop of force makes a legal ruling that has to be adhered to.

    The ethical dimension then becomes part of the process of statecraft. It is now divorced from the study of ethics in the philosophy class room. To deny validity to a principle because it has become part of the state and it monopoly of legal violence is contradictory.

    The principle in question may indeed be moral and just. An obvious case would be in the case of stealing. If a thief is caught he is punished. The state steps in and no one will disagree that this is the correct way to punish the criminal. However, it could be that a particularly kind individual does not want to press charges and may even lie to the police and say that he gave the stolen goods as a present. This happens in Les Miserable in the opening scenes of the book. Now we have a higher moral law that relates to the individual goodness of a christian cleric who does not want to press charges.So we have a just law from the state and an act of kindness with a higher moral dimension than that of the state;which in fact operates to produce exceptional moral clarity in the thief on his reflection as to what has happened to him and he becomes, as a result, a changed moral agent.

  3. Should you choose to stop denying reality and the efficacy of your own mind and to follow the path marked “reason” (a very long shot, I know), you might care to discover and understand a demonstrably true theory of rights based on a demonstrably true theory of ethics, so here’s the link again:

    http://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2011-fall/ayn-rand-theory-rights.asp

    A couple of questions: Does “certainty” presuppose “objectivity”? Does “objectivity” presuppose “consciousness”?

  4. Certainly objectivity presupposes consciousness. A thinking subject is the one who apprehends his or her theory as being objective and gives it that label.

    However, whatever label is given it operates in the field of consciousness. Certainly about objectivity or just plain certainly about anything also operates in that field of the thinking observer. The thinking observer is conscious to various degrees. He may be a drunk who is not particularly conscious or a philosopher who is wrangling with tough questions and has a moment of inspiration. In any case, both cases presuppose a level of consciousness on the part of the observing thinker.

    Objectivity is a label given in the field of consciousness and it can be given by a drunk or a philosopher; the commonality is consciousness of objectivity, of the label given.

  5. First tell me what you mean by “certainty”, “objectivity” and “consciousness”. Would you disagree with the following very preliminary understanding of these expressions?

    We normally say “I am certain” merely as a strong way of claiming knowledge of something. For example I might say that I am certain that we will find the dog sleeping on the sofa when we get home, (even though the dog is not allowed on the sofa). By contrast, we may say that we will not accept that our favourite football team is doomed to relegation “until it’s a mathematical certainty”, by which we mean that the team can no longer gain the points required for safety (although a reorganisation of the league might increase the size of the division so that no relegation occurs). A family court may express its certainty in deciding a paternity suit based on evidence indicating that only one father in 100 billion matches the relevant DNA profile. A mathematician may equally withhold a conclusion of certainty after verifying Goldbach’s conjecture for all numbers smaller than 4 quintillion. In logic we might offer certainty for fundamental ideas like the classic laws of thought, which cannot be denied without immediate paradox. Certainty in this latter, very strong sense seems to be an abstracted feature of our thinking that we impose on experience as part of the process of perception and understanding.

    “Objectivity” is commonly understood in terms of independence from mental states or events. It is contrasted with “subjectivity”, which is correspondingly related to mental states or events. In the strongest sense there is no such thing as an “objective” claim, as all claims are propositional attitudes that necessarily involve mental states or events for their formulation and assertion. Even the classic laws of thought are not “objective” in this strong sense. Instead we use “objective” as a term of tendency and contrast to describe things that we have chosen to set beyond the evident influence of mental states or events, such as the movements of celestial bodies or the behaviour of chemicals under relevantly controlled conditions. By contrast, we reserve “subjective” for things that seem to rely almost entirely on mental states or events, such as the assertion that a sequence of sounds constitutes music or that a sequence of ideas forms a joke.

    Our ordinary use of “consciousness” refers to the “waking state” of an individual, and is contrasted with the sleeping or otherwise unconscious state, and secondarily to the state of other things that seem not to possess any such state. We admit to “degrees” and even “levels” of consciousness. In one sense the term is synonymous with “awareness” or “cognisance”, and it would appear that there is a special branch of this called “self-consciousness” or the sense of self as a unified being. We accept that people can be conscious, and also that dogs, sparrows and beavers display obvious signs of consciousness. An earthworm responds in predictable ways to changes in its environment, as do many protozoa and bacteria. The scope for consciousness in the plant kingdom is less clear. Consciousness in some sense seems to be important for natural language, at least at the point where natural language diverges from generally predictable behaviour patterns.

  6. Firstly certainty. My understanding here is that Descartes. Briefly, I can doubt everything, but I can not doubt my self. Why not? I think that I am doubting therefore I must exist, in order to doubt. Everything outside of me could of course be a dream. I could dream I am butterfly. And of course a butterfly could dream that it is me! However the case, the I remains the central point and my thinking process warped by dreams and awareness through my life of the insects etc of planet earth are the secondary factor. The first point is me. And of that I am certain. Even mathematical certainly is now impossible, because I may be in a dream that makes things seem certain which are in fact not so. Hence the only thing I am certain of is myself.

    Hence, the only objectivity reality of which I am certain is myself.

    Finally, I am conscious and quite rightly you have said at different levels. I can increase and decrease in consciousness. This consciousness is separate from my thinking about myself. It is is the mirror in which the thinking takes place but of course like a mirror remains forever reflecting. It can never become the reflection of thoughts, dreams etc. It remains forever the objective fact of myself, my true self, my conscious self, the mirror subject that is I, quite apart from what I think about myself mental self, my body, the world and of others. However, to apprehend all this I do need to have a think about it and hence thought, though not me, can lead me to fully appreciate the certainly of me, the observer, the conscious mirror that reflects this world of thoughts, objects,people etc. Cogito ergo sum. I think therefore I am.

  7. It’s a trivial point that the first person singular suffix in Latin smuggles in the existential rabbit that Descartes then triumphantly pulls from his hat, and of course the original French form je pense, donc je suis performs the same trick with less subterfuge. We could equally well insist on the existence of something specific that corresponds to the “it” in “it’s funny how people are so easily deceived about the world by the language forms that they use to describe experience”.

    In short, Descartes was not entitled to say I think, but only some thinking is going on. No unified or persisting identity of any thinker is implied in this.

    The force of the Cartesian cogito is significantly greater when expressed in languages that rely on a strong distinction between subject and object. It doesn’t work so well when the major premise is expressed without a subject, as in the Finnish [minussa] ajatellaan, siis olen [olemassa]. Finnish notoriously manages quite well without a grammatical subject in contexts where English feels more or less compelled to introduce one (e.g. “it‘s raining”, “there‘s a fly in my soup”, “you/one must speculate to accumulate”).

    A more modern approach asks what conditions must be satisfied for existential questions to be possible at all, and argues that existence is already implied in the ability to formulate the question of existence in a meaningful way. Cartesian doubt can only be formulated using meaningful expressions and meaning is already fundamentally collective. If the doubter can even understand the doubt, then there must already be others who can do so too.

  8. Descartes effectively asked “What if all that I am ever aware of are experiences inside my mind, and that I experience no external reality? How do I even know there is an external reality?”

    In order to identify “an experience inside my mind” I have to contrast my mental experiences with something that is outside my mind. Without the contrast between the internal and the external, “internal” loses its meaning. If everything was “inside” my mind, how could I know it? – the relational concepts “internal” and “inside” would not be possible without external reality (existence). The concepts “internal” and “inside” presuppose external reality (existence).

    The same reasoning applies to the dream state. If my life were a dream, how could I know it? It is only by contrasting the dream state with the state of wakefulness (the state in which I experience external reality) that I am able to form the concept “dream”. The concept “dream” presupposes wakefulness (the state in which I experience external reality or existence). And it is only the contrast between external reality (existence) and consciousness that makes the concept “consciousness” possible; consciousness presupposes external reality (existence).

    The logical fallacy of attempting to retain and use a concept while denying one or more of its presuppositions violates the hierarchy of concepts and is a fallacy rampant in the history of philosophy. It was first identified, to the best of my knowledge, by Ayn Rand, and she called it “the fallacy of the stolen concept.”

    http://www.rationalresponders.com/forum/sapient/philosophy_and_psychology_with_chaoslord_and_todangst/6715

    Enjoy.

  9. By “certainty”, “objectivity” and “consciousness” I mean the concepts, not merely the words denoting or symbolising them. (In accordance with Ayn Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism, by “concept” I mean a mental integration of two or more units that are isolated, by a process of abstraction, according to a specific characteristic and united by a specific definition; by “definition” I mean a statement that identifies the units subsumed under a concept; and by “unit” I mean an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar units (for example, two dogs are two units). Thus, it is the identity (or nature) of the units subsumed under a concept that determines the definition of the concept. Any further elaboration of these terms here would be beyond the scope of this blog comment.)

    According to Objectivism “consciousness” is a special class of concept – an “axiomatic concept” – and it is important at this point to define this term. The following is Ayn Rand’s definition of “axiomatic concept” from her book ‘An Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology’:

    “An axiomatic concept is the identification of a primary fact of reality, which cannot be analyzed, i.e., reduced to other facts or broken into component parts. It is implicit in all facts and in all knowledge. It is the fundamentally given and directly perceived or experienced, which requires no proof or explanation, but on which all proofs and explanations rest.

    The first and primary axiomatic concepts are “existence,” “identity” (which is a corollary of “existence”) and “consciousness.” One can study what exists and how consciousness functions; but one cannot analyze (or “prove”) existence as such, or consciousness as such. These are irreducible primaries. An attempt to “prove” them is self-contradictory: it is an attempt to “prove” existence by means of non-existence, and consciousness by means of unconsciousness.”

    There is a proper order in which the concepts “consciousness”, “objectivity” and “certainty” must be discussed, and that is the order (or hierarchy) in which an individual first grasps (at least implicitly) them. One cannot grasp the concept “certainty” (or “certain”) until one has first grasped, at least implicitly, the concept “objectivity” (or “objective”), and one cannot grasp the concept “objectivity” (or “objective”) until one has first grasped the concept “consciousness” (or “conscious”). So with this in mind let’s examine each of these concepts in the order in which they are first grasped.

    Consciousness basically is awareness. But awareness is not a primary; it presupposes an object of awareness – an entity that exists beyond itself within reality. (By “reality” I mean the sum total of existence.) (How the concept “object” relates to the concept “objectivity” should become apparent later.) Note at this point that in the consciousness-object relationship, the role of consciousness (the subject) is passive; consciousness merely perceives its objects, it does not actively control them in any way, because existence is what it is independent of consciousness – any consciousness. Consciousness is thus dependent upon existence, and we can say that existence holds primacy over consciousness (Ayn Rand named this principle “the primacy of existence”). So, to be conscious (or aware) is to be conscious (or aware) of something (something with a particular nature or identity) in reality. A consciousness with nothing to be conscious of (i.e., with no object) would not be consciousness at all; it would be a contradiction. A consciousness conscious only of itself as an object would also be a contradiction, because before it could be conscious of itself, it would first have to be conscious of an object beyond itself. Consciousness is dependent not only upon its objects, but also upon some form of physical sensory apparatus, housed within some form of physical body, as the means to perceiving its objects. Consciousness is essentially an evolutionary adaptation that imparts a survival advantage upon those living organisms possessing it.

    Ayn Rand in The Objectivist Newsletter of 1965 had this to say about “objectivity”:

    “[Objectivity] pertains to the relationship of consciousness to existence. Metaphysically, it is the recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of any perceiver’s consciousness. Epistemologically, it is the recognition of the fact that a perceiver’s (man’s) consciousness must acquire knowledge of reality by certain means (reason) in accordance with certain rules (logic). This means that although reality is immutable and, in any given context, only one answer is true, the truth is not automatically available to a human consciousness and can be obtained only by a certain mental process which is required of every man who seeks knowledge—that there is no substitute for this process, no escape from the responsibility for it, no shortcuts, no special revelations to privileged observers—and that there can be no such thing as a final “authority” in matters pertaining to human knowledge. Metaphysically, the only authority is reality; epistemologically—one’s own mind. The first is the ultimate arbiter of the second.”

    Basically, one is being objective when one orients one’s consciousness to reality, and one can do this only by engaging one’s faculty of reason – the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by the senses, thereby producing knowledge of reality. Reason as a process begins with the perceptual observation of reality (the base of knowledge). It then proceeds, by the method of logic (the basic rule of which is “non-contradictory identification”), to form concepts (the form of reason) based upon that perceptual observation. Reason is the means of validating one’s concepts; of forming higher level concepts from more basic or lower level concepts and validating them; of forming propositions and principles from those concepts and validating them; of drawing and validating conclusions, etc. This is how knowledge is built up. At any point in time a man’s knowledge, if it is truly knowledge, i.e., acquired through the process of reason, is an organised, hierarchical and integrated whole, each part connecting with all other parts without contradiction. It is because reason is not infallible, however, that one has to check logically all one’s ideas all the way down to one’s perceptual observations of reality. One can engage reason – i.e., be objective – and still make an error of judgement. One can arrive at a false proposition objectively, but all true propositions require objectivity; or, restated, a true proposition is necessarily objective, but an objective proposition is not necessarily true (I note my error on this point in a previous post) NB: Truth is the product of the recognition (i.e., identification) of facts of reality – facts that are in reality whether any consciousness grasps them as truths or not.

    In regard to “certainty” Leonard Peikoff in lecture six of his lecture series ‘The Philosophy of Objectivism’ has this to say: ““Certain” represents an assessment of the evidence for a conclusion; it is usually contrasted with two other broad types of assessment: “possible” and “probable.” . . . Idea X is “certain” if, in a given context of knowledge, the evidence for X is conclusive. In such a context, all the evidence supports X and there is no evidence to support any alternative . . .” So certainty relates to a defined context and can be reached only through the process of reason. In lecture five of the same lecture series peikoff has this to say about “context”: “By “context” we mean the sum of cognitive elements conditioning the acquisition, validity or application of any item of human knowledge. Knowledge is an organization or integration of interconnected elements, each relevant to the others . . . Knowledge is not a mosaic of independent pieces each of which stands apart from the rest . . . .”

    So, “certainty” presupposes “objectivity” and “objectivity” presupposes “consciousness”.

    So, can we be certain, in the full context of man’s knowledge of reality, including man’s nature as a rational being, that Ayn Rand’s theory of rights is a demonstrably true theory of rights based on a demonstrably true theory of ethics. You bet we can:

    http://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2011-fall/ayn-rand-theory-rights.asp

  10. Some days ago I noted:

    I’m afraid I see little point in getting into debate with some fundamentalist who feels that a debate is already finally settled merely by dropping the name of some guru into a conversation and alleging that the final truth on highly intractable questions of moral philosophy can be found by reading sacred books and watching long presentations.

    True to form, the fundamentalist pleads with us to read the sacred scriptures, and then proceeds to quote long tracts from those scriptures. As expected, we find those tracts filled with special, quite unintuitive definitions of key expressions and esoteric appeals to what the guru deems “first and primary axiomatic concepts” or the “proper order of discussion”. If only we grasp the special system, we shall perforce appreciate its absolute truth. This is absolutely typical fundamentalist methodology, irrespective of whether the content is Scientology, Presbylutheranism, Marxism, Islamism, or whatever idea system is the flavour of the month. Instead of true engagement with intractable philosophical problems, we simply get tedious special pleading from the closed minds of people who evidently already have the final answer to everything.

    I also remarked above:

    ask yourself what it would take for you to give up your fundamentalist opinion

    This suggestion was completely ignored. Resistance to such challenges is part of the psychology of fundamentalism. Preachers are trained to respond “get thee behind me Satan” at the first sign of doubt.

    This is why there is little point in such debates.

    For the record, the “ep&met” elements of the fundamentalist screed incorporate an evident Cartesian dualism with more than a suggestion of representation theory and logical atomism. All very TL-P 2.1511 and as such, all thoroughly discredited.

    The moral philosophy considerations advanced above in turn lead me to formulate the following name-dropping analogy question:

    Robert Pirsig is to Galen Strawson as Ayn Rand is to Robert Nozick.
    Discuss

  11. “Metaphysically, it is the recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of any perceiver’s consciousness”

    No reality must be perceived. The perception is the key to reality and its apprehension. Consciousness is the key element to all existence. It is the base for the apprehension of all that exists, including itself.

    “Consciousness basically is awareness. But awareness is not a primary; it presupposes an object of awareness – an entity that exists beyond itself within reality.”

    No consciousness could be aware of itself without no external reality beyond itself. Consciousness can make an object of itself as it is the root of all apprehension even unto itself. It would be aware of consciousness like a mirror that reflects nothing but is aware of itself. We are talking about consciousness and if it can not be self aware it no consciousness at all. This is the primary presupposition of the realty that is consciousness.

  12. “If the doubter can even understand the doubt, then there must already be others who can do so too.”

    Agreed;hence there could of course be another significant other that we can not see, and who controls everything. This other could of course be God. Why? It is not logically incoherent. So it is a possibility.

  13. hence there could of course be another significant other that we can not see, and who controls everything

    Before you start waxing lyrical on the medicinal properties of tar-oil, I refer you to the response of Pierre-Simon Laplace to Napoleon:

    Je n’avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là

    The anti-private language argument (and the general approach that it represents) is not about establishing a role for some omnipotent observer or universal guarantor of experience (“God in the quad”). It concerns the conditions that must hold for such Cartesian or Berkelian questions to be even possible.

    If I had to specify the point on which most popular theology fails absolutely, it is the failure to take aseity seriously. The disputes that then arise between rival camps resemble conflicts between the characters of the Harry Potter novels concerning the character of JK Rowling.

  14. “It concerns the conditions that must hold for such Cartesian or Berkelian questions to be even possible”

    Agreed. And I have said that it is consciousness which is the primary base for all existence and thus for Cartesian or Berkelian questions or any other questions to be looked into.It is from this base of consciousness that we can project a trajectory to the universal creator but of course this remains in the realm of human reasoning and no one can with certainty say such a being exists; only that from the data available that it is not an unreasonable hypothesis.

    On a personal note justicedemon do you actually live in Finland? Are you a Finn yourself? I am in the good ol’ UK myself where we had the debate about Sikhs and turbans on motorbikes in the seventies! It is old news to us and it has never caused any problem after the dust settled in the early seventies. I remember one guy who was not a sikh who did not want to wear a helmet, wearing a turban instead. An old english guy, who made the papers. He lived dangerously but I am sure he was ok with his motorbike riding experiences. I can still see him now with his turban on standing next to his motor bike. Actually, if not for Vlad I think I might have forgotten about that fine gentleman.

  15. You can’t “look into” a question that is not possible in the first place. Empirical idealism essentially assumes that expressions have denotation through some unspecified “coupling” of a term with the “real thing” that it stands for. The picture theory of meaning gave one account of this alleged process, but this entire approach to reference has been defunct since the 1950s, principally because of the anti-private language argument.

    Both camps in the current “Dawkins debate” have failed to appreciate the notion of Divine aseity.

    I am an immigrant in Finland. Of course the case of the Wolverhampton bus drivers and Mandla v Dowell-Lee are well known in the English-speaking world, as is the Motor-Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act 1976. The stand taken recently by middle management at Veolia Transport Vantaa Oy is an interesting blast from the past for those of us who are familiar with these UK debates of 40 years ago and have since grown fully accustomed to seeing police officers, traffic wardens and other authority figures wearing the Sikh turban.

  16. Constant change is the nature of the world, so words are a rough way to describe the world around us in any case. And as the labeling of things as we do in every day language is the best resource we have. I am not going to throw that out because to do so would of course not allow me to have any rational argument to its full degree. I only accept the limitations on language usage to the point where it allows me to have a rational discussion;if it causes me to say this is unintelligible etc due to the private nature of what each individual means when he discusses something with me then I draw the line. Indeed one has to accept the limited nature of language to accept the basic premise that we can have a rational discussion of things within a framework where we have a rough idea, but not a minutely precise idea of what we mean. I assert that a precise minutely detailed idea of all things is possible in the mind of God because only he has that capacity to compute the vast array of what each individual means when he says something. So it basically comes down to computing power. The vast arrays of human mind are not linked into a central CPU which computes each and every meaning, so that participants in any debate know precisely what they and their fellow humans mean when they use a particular word.

    In any case I think you have wrapped up the case of Sikh turban with a good summary as is your style when it comes to the legal summation of things.

  17. You seem to have some emotional investment in empirical idealism, but the position is self-refuting in much the same way as the assertion “all general propositions are false”. This means that it’s quite dead as a serious philosophical view.

    I should add that this has no bearing whatsoever on any contemporary theology that properly respects the notion of Divine aseity.

  18. Well yes there is an emotional investment in Deity. The trajectory of my thinking about the minds of men and women in computational terms is accurate to a point as logic is indeed involved but then sometimes up pops insight and dazzling creativity so my trajectory has to move beyond computing prowess to the mind of Genius in human terms and the mind of God, the creator of all computational models, insight and creativity, and Genius. In other words we come back to the definition of God as the highest conceivable being. His mind is the highest conceivable mind of all minds. His power is the highest conceivable power of all powers. In other words my idealism is beyond that of the empirical world (though it starts there) and it stretches ever upward and into the realm of the Deity, and of course at that level it certainly embraces faith, and thus this produces a profound emotional investment.

    If you want to justicedemon have the last word; but we have taken the empirical product of a turban all the way to a realm that is transcendent to this realm in which we live and wear turbans in.

  19. The idea that Deity can be captured in definitions and subordinated to unspecified scales of high and higher, great and greater is part of what I mean by denying Divine aseity. It is quite rare to find any contemporary theologian who will argue explicitly that “God” is a proper name rigidly designating some unique entity that can be pointed out and distinguished, and yet this is precisely what both sides of the modern “Dawkins debate” necessarily assume. Along with that assumption comes a whole lot of irreligious nonsense about the fundamental nature of religious conviction as a matter of assenting to various propositions.

    Religious expression is necessarily metaphorical, but some metaphors are more helpful than others in illuminating the notion of Divine aseity. Too many contributors to the contemporary debate seem to be labouring under the limitations of the potter and clay metaphor when the author and novel metaphor would be far more useful.

  20. Bus Driver Wins Turban Fight In Finland
    February 27, 2014 by Yle News Source: yle.fi

    25.2.2014: A bus driver in Vantaa has won his fight to wear a turban at work. His year-long dispute with the Veolia bus company was resolved thanks to an agreement between the Transport Workers Union (AKT) and the employers’ organisation (ALT). The resolution was reported first by Helsingin Sanomat.

    GillSS (39K)

    Gill Sukhdarshan Singh has been in dispute with his employer, Veolia Transport Vantaa, for more than a year. Veolia had banned his turban, saying it was not part of the company’s uniform and that he therefore could not wear it while driving his bus.

    Legal wrangling ensued, with appeals to the southern Finland regional administration and finally, in January, after Veolia refused to budge despite official reports in Gill’s favour, the police.

    After that, the employers’ and employees’ organisations got together on the national level to hammer out a deal.

    HS reports that the agreement means that Sikhs should be able to wear either their own turban or one provided by their employer.

    “It feels nice,” Gill told Yle News on Tuesday. “I can wear my turban at work now and that’s the important thing.”

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