El Inglis: On the Failure of Law Enforcement

by Baron Bodissey  Gates of VIenna

Hanging at Tyburn
From our regular contributor El Inglés comes the first in what will be an ongoing series of essays taking as their core subject matter a) the mechanics of the Islam-induced breakdown of law and order in European countries and b) the likely nature of the response.

On the Failure of Law Enforcement
by El Inglés


I will argue in this essay that there are a number of mechanisms and tendencies in place in European countries that make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to control or restrain the burgeoning criminality of their Muslim populations under extant political paradigms. Readers of certain of my other essays will be familiar with the type of argument I advance here, though I apply it in this essay to new subject matter.

It should be understood that this text is essentially a piece of analysis, an attempt to rigorously frame and discuss one large and important piece of the problem we face thanks to Islam. Though it does not attempt to formulate a response, it is written in the hope that those keen to defend their countries and peoples from the depredations of Muslim colonization will find it useful in clarifying their own thinking.

The Human Substrate Problem

First, it is necessary to discuss what I have chosen to call the Human Substrate Problem. Though this part of the analysis may seem slightly esoteric, I ask that readers bear with it, as its relevance will become clearer later on.

The Human Substrate Problem derives from the historically irrefutable observation that racially and/or culturally different groups in a given society tend to have very different statistical properties with respect to crime and other forms of deviance. Note that the causes of these differences are not of any particular importance here. I myself believe that both racial and cultural factors play important roles in creating these disparities, but for the purposes of this essay, it suffices to ignore the question of causality and focus on the mere existence of the differences and their persistence with respect to time.

Here, we will create a conceptual model simple enough to be easily grasped, but complex enough to capture some of the intricacies and seeming paradoxes of crime and criminality in our societies.

Imagine a society in which only two racially and culturally distinct groups exist: the Blues and the Greens, who exist in equal numbers. The Blues are relatively law-abiding and the Greens relatively criminal, a state of affairs that we describe by creating a composite index of criminality, C, for all individuals in our societies. This is plotted on the x-axis of a graph that has number of individuals, N, plotted on the y-axis, with the stipulation that C is normally distributed for both Blues and Greens, with the same standard deviation but with the Green mean being higher than the Blue mean. Individuals are not necessarily fixed in place within these distributions. Law-abiding folk can drift toward crime, and those with criminal backgrounds can, in principle, go straight. However, this Brownian motion of individuals around the distribution does not alter its statistical properties; it is merely a reshuffling of components within a persisting whole. This state of affairs is represented in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Law Enforcement
Now we must imagine an addition being made to our graph: an incarceration point. The incarceration point, as its name suggests, marks that degree of criminality which will result in the incarceration of the criminal in question, which is to say that everyone to the right of the line is incarcerated. This oversimplification (some criminals will escape detection, and criminals newly released from prison will be at large even if they are, strictly speaking, to the right of the incarceration point) could be overcome by refining the model further, but we need not concern ourselves with that at the moment. Figure 2 shows the Blues and the Greens as they appear on the graph, the incarceration point, and the incarcerated and non-incarcerated fractions of the Blue and Green populations. It is clear that a greater fraction of the Greens than of the Blues is incarcerated at any given point in time; this is precisely what we would expect on the basis of their higher criminality. But this simple model implies certain other things too.

Figure 2 Law Enforcement
Focus for a moment on those fractions of the Blue and Green populations not in prison, i.e. those to the left of the line. We can see that the non-incarcerated fraction of the Greens is relatively close to the incarceration line, which means that the mean C-value of the non-incarcerated Greens is higher than that of their Blue equivalents. Given that crime is committed by the non-incarcerated, we must expect the crime rates of the Greens, therefore, to be higher than those of the Blues. This is an important point: even if the law is applied to both the Blues and the Greens in a completely evenhanded manner (represented by their incarceration points being in the same place), the Greens will be both disproportionality incarcerated and disproportionality criminal. In other words, under the same legal system, there is no way to equalize their crime rates.

Our model captures and explains one of the puzzling phenomena that confront those who think about crime: that disproportionally incarcerated groups are, without major exception as far as I am aware, also still disproportionately criminal despite the larger fraction of their most criminal members already locked away. However, there is something else that it sheds light on as well. Let us imagine that, for whatever reason or reasons, the government of our hypothetical country chooses to apply the law somewhat less assiduously to the Greens. We represent this in our model by making a distinction between Blue and Green incarceration points, with the Green incarceration point being to the right of the Blue incarceration point. For the time being, we will ignore the obvious objection that shifting the incarceration point for the Greens alters their behavioural profiles and increases their criminality, C, (which it surely would) and stipulate that their C curve stays the same, as shown in Figure 3 below. What happens now?

Figure 3 Law Enforcement
The fraction of the Greens incarcerated is still larger than the fraction of the Blues incarcerated, and the Green crime rates will now be higher than that of the Blues by an even greater margin. Bearing in mind that we have, in a manner of speaking, simply let some number of otherwise criminal Greens out of prison and back onto the streets, this rise in Green crime rates as a whole is hardly surprising. However, the significance of this lies in the fact that we now have a way of explaining how the Greens can possess the following, seemingly contradictory characteristics: a) being more criminal than other groups in a society (as measured by the mean C-value of the non-incarcerated), b) being incarcerated in greater numbers than others in a society (as indicated by the fraction of them to the right of their incarceration point), and c) being treated more leniently by the long arm of the law (as made clear by their higher incarceration point).

Treated with kid gloves, filling up the prisons, and causing chaos on the streets; such are the characteristics of our as yet entirely hypothetical population of Greens. If the law is applied to them without fear or favour, they impose a disproportionate burden on the law enforcement apparatus and criminal justice system whilst also inflicting disproportionate damage directly through their criminal behaviour. If the law loosens its grip upon them, the burden on the prisons is eased, but the burden placed on the common man through their disregard for law and order soars. Such is the nature of the problem, which is why I call it the Human Substrate problem; it is the underlying behavioural and attitudinal characteristics of the population that cause difficulties. In response, the state seems to have little option but to trade the two evils of greater incarceration and greater crime off against each other by shifting the incarceration point up and down.

Our Predicament and its ‘Solution’
– – – – – – – –
It will hopefully not be lost on readers that the rudimentary model of crime and criminality developed above on the basis of the Human Substrate Problem model is not so unrelated to reality as it may have seemed at the outset. Indeed, it is the reality of crime in heterogeneous societies. In this essay, I propose to apply it to an analysis of Muslims and natives in European countries, and the gist of the analysis that is to follow can probably already be guessed at. To be completely explicit, it is that the Muslim populations of European countries are akin to the Greens in the model outlined above, and that the native populations are akin to the Blues, with the single caveat that the sizes of these two populations are not in fact equal, a stipulation made earlier to avoid unnecessary complications in presenting the model.

Our problem then, consists of large Muslim populations of whom the following can be said: a) their criminality profiles lie so far to the right of those of their host societies that they must be some combination of substantially over-incarcerated and substantially over-criminal, irrespective of where their incarceration point lies, and b) it so happens that weak and confused governments have allowed the Muslim incarceration points to edge up, sometimes significantly, in relation to the baseline incarceration points, which is to say that they have chosen greater Muslim crime and less Muslim incarceration than would otherwise be the case. We now have a fairly rigorous statement of the problem. How do we solve it?

The most obvious candidate for a solution to the problem would be the forcing of the Muslim incarceration point back down until it rejoins the baseline incarceration point. How could this be accomplished? To a greater or lesser extent, the police, court system and prison system would have to be expanded, with the ultimate target of all this expansion (i.e. the Muslim population) being obvious to all and sundry. Considerable financial and other costs would have to be incurred, and the state and society as a whole would have to implicitly revise their relationship with the Muslim population.

If the UK — to pick a country — were to take on this challenge and ensure that the Muslim incarceration point were identical to the baseline incarceration point (and this would be relatively feasible in the UK, whose Muslim population is not so chronically criminal as that of, say, France), we would have a situation in which the British people (i.e. the actual, historic, white British people) would have to bear two burdens: the excess crime committed by their Muslim populations, and the excess financial and organizational costs incurred through bringing to justice and incarcerating a disproportionate fraction of the Muslim population. Might this be an acceptable solution to a difficult situation? It would surely be at least as effective a response as those implemented by many other countries with troublesome and unruly minorities. It is, after all, how America has solved the disproportionate criminality of its black population.

But what sort of solution has that turned out to be? Once-great cities, from Detroit and St. Louis to Baltimore and Philadelphia, hollowed out, with crumbling inner cities populated by a degenerate, desperate black underclass, and surrounded by the suburbs into which whites and the black middle class have long since fled. Massive population decline in these same cities, with St. Louis losing over 50% of its population from its peak of several decades ago. Murder rates and robbery rates in the black population seven and eight times higher, respectively, than for whites. Blacks seven times more likely to be in prison than whites. If this is success, what would failure look like?

This essay is not about race. Nor is it about America. I am simply attempting here to convey the reality of a specific instance of the Human Substrate Problem. And the difficulties that America faces with its black population, are, arguably, dwarfed by the problems that certain European countries now face or soon could with regards to their Muslim populations. For we have no guarantee that our societies consist of only Blues and Greens. Perhaps they contain another group, the Oranges. What if the Oranges are to the Greens as the Greens are to the Blues? What if their criminality profile is as far to the right of the Greens as that of the Greens is to the right of the Blues, as shown in Figure 4? What then?

Figure 4 Law Enforcement
We have already noted that Greens are significantly overincarcerated and overcriminal relative to the Blues. Let us now assume that the Blue-Green disparities are bearable for the Blue-Green society as a whole, whatever exactly one understands by this term. The same cannot be true for the Oranges, whose incarceration and crime rates (as indicated, again by the mean C-value of the non-incarcerated) are so much higher than those of the Blues as to create a huge qualitative gap between the two, and a large gap between them and the Greens. The Oranges impose massive costs on the society as a whole, via both the huge financial costs required to restrain their criminality, and the massive costs, financial and human, of the crime they commit. In other words, even ensuring that the Orange incarceration point remains the baseline incarceration point cannot create a situation in which we could feel that we have solved the problem of Orange criminality. On the contrary, their criminality will plague our model society and its people, be they Blue or Green, (or, for that matter, Orange) and criminal justice will come to resemble a mechanism created solely for the purpose of keeping their savagery at bay.

What happens if the Orange incarceration point now starts to slide to the right as the state, for whatever reason, takes a step back from applying the law fully to the Oranges, as shown in Figure 5? As in the Blue-Green comparison, their incarceration rate will fall and their crime rate rise, yielding a situation in which they are still hugely overincarcerated but in which their crime rates soar to a point at which they represent a threat to the very nature and cohesion of the society they inhabit. Again, this is the stark reality of the Human Substrate Problem: a problematic human substrate presents no good options for dealing with it, only a trade-off between bad and worse.

Figure 5 Law Enforcement
As was suggested earlier, keeping Orange and Blue incarceration points the same would result in incarceration rates and crime rates being so much higher for Oranges that there would effectively be two societies in one country, with a single law enforcement apparatus struggling to deal with the very different problems they create. Bad though this would be, allowing the Muslim incarceration point to slide is a recipe for total collapse, and will result in an inexorable breakdown of law and order. Combined with growth in the Orange population as a fraction of the whole, it must and will destroy the society in question.

We need look no further than France to see this process in action. Insofar as I understand the situation there at all, it seems to me that this is an accurate description of the current situation, which is to say that the Blue French have a very large Orange Muslim population. Furthermore, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands also seem to have rapidly growing Orange Muslim populations as well, though these populations are not yet so large as to create a situation as dire as that which obtains in France. For reasons that are not easy to understand, the UK seems to have a Green Muslim population rather than an Orange one, though I suspect, for reasons that I will not go into here, that it will become Orange over time.

The Likelihood of the Problem Being ‘Solved’

Having stated some fairly strong reservations as to whether the problem posed by Muslim criminality in Europe is soluble in any useful sense of the term, I would now like to make a key claim, to wit, that it is highly improbable that even the stop-gap solution, i.e. the reapplication of the baseline incarceration point to Muslims, will be implemented by mainstream politicians. I consider this to be true irrespective of whether the Muslim population of a given country is closer to Green than Orange or closer to Orange than Green, though the probability of such action is even less for the latter type of Muslim population.

There are many reasons why Muslim incarceration points will have an inexorable tendency to creep up and be extraordinarily resistant to being pushed down again. Discussing them all here would be excessive, so I will simply present a handful of the most important.

1) Prevalence of Narrative of Oppression

First and foremost, there still exist large constituencies in our political and media establishments who are deranged enough to believe that the criminality of Muslims derives from the racist oppression visited upon them by the white man. In the absence of such hideous white supremacism, the Arab population of Sweden would be no more criminal than the Swedes, the Turkish population of Germany would be no more criminal than the Germans, and the Somali population of the UK would be no more criminal than the British.

This bizarre delusion evokes a significant degree of sympathy for these downtrodden Third-World masses as they merrily inflict robbery, riots, rapes, assaults, and murder both on the people of their adopted countries and each other. Every day, fewer people believe that this behaviour derives from our actions, and more wake up to the obvious truth that it derives from who and what these people are. Nonetheless, substantial and influential constituencies in all European countries are still committed to the notion that freeing these people from the terrible oppression they face at our hands will be far more effective in reducing their sky-high crime rates than applying the law to them. As long as this remains the case, generating the political will required to reunite the Muslim and baseline incarceration points will be extremely difficult.

2) Dynamic of Escalation and Effects on Cost-Benefit Analysis of Police Action

This is emerging as a key factor in interactions between Muslims and the state in several countries, and warrants extended discussion. In fact, it warrants a degree of discussion so great that I have decided to postpone in-depth analysis for a future essay. Here, I will have to be brief, and explain the problem through reference to recent events in Brussels.

In preparation for Ramadan this year, that holy time when the behaviour of the believers best exemplifies the values of their psychotic creed, the police in Brussels were issued with instructions to avoid all unnecessary ‘provocations’ of Muslims in the Belgian capital. As far as the layman could discern, these provocations consisted of virtually all normal police work conducted in the presence of Muslims, and normal human activities such as eating and drinking. However, even these sterling efforts on the part of the ‘law enforcement’ apparatus of this disintegrating city proved insufficient. One particular Muslim youth, having got away with taunting and challenging the police for days, was finally arrested at his home one evening. A crowd of some twenty agitated believers gathered outside the entrance of said domicile as the arrest was taking place to explain to the police the error of their ways and prevent the great injustice inherent in the application of Belgian law to Muslims. Eventually, the police were forced to pepper spray their way through the slaves of Allah to take the youth to the local police station.

The believers not being the type to take such unconscionable police brutality lying down, a crowd of several dozen of them soon gathered outside the police station in question to contest the issue further, by hurling rocks and abuse at the unfortunate edifice and those within. The situation escalated to the point where the riot police were called in to quell the situation, which obliged them to engage in running battles with an estimated two hundred Muslim youth.

Now, I confess that I have no background in criminology, law enforcement, or anything else of even oblique relevance to these matters. But it is surely not beyond the bounds of possibility that the Brussels police, come Ramadan next year, might decide to further reduce the ‘provocations’ that they visit upon hapless Muslims even further. Is it really worth having a riot, their leaders will ask themselves, simply to apprehend one youth who will probably be out of prison the next day at the latest? In a nutshell, brute, tribal responses to law enforcement rewrite the cost-benefit analyses of law enforcement processes so completely that they can no longer be expected to function properly.

And indeed, they do not.

3) Magnitude of Extra Financial Commitments Required

The law enforcement apparatus of a developed country is an exceptionally large, complex and expensive entity. In the UK, the size of the prison population and the costs of maintaining that population are a perennial topic of discussion and debate, and sometimes a cause of agonized disagreement. Incarceration is a fantastically expensive way of keeping criminals out of commission, costing tens of thousands of pounds per prisoner per year in the UK. It is very hard to imagine any European government embarking on a plan to expand the criminal justice system and law enforcement apparatus at a time of such financial difficulties as we endure at present, when prison chiefs are actually being ordered to slash their budgets.

4) Electoral Disadvantage

Muslims now exist in sufficiently large numbers in European countries to exert significant influence over election results, particularly at the local and municipal levels. The scale of the problem and its consequences are well-attested to by the fact that Rotterdam now has a Muslim mayor who is also a Moroccan citizen. The socialist politicians who decided to re-engineer the demographics of their countries for political objectives I will not pretend to understand are unlikely to lose favour with their imported savages any more than they have to. Given that one of the reasons for their initial importation was to shift the electoral balance to favour the left, the probability of such action appears all the more remote.

5) Demographic Issues

Lurking behind this entire discussion is the demographic bogeyman, with, for example the growth rate of the Muslim population of the UK being ten times higher than that of the country as a whole. I hope I have managed to convince readers that forcing the Muslim incarceration point back down to the baseline incarceration point would already constitute a staggering challenge in many European countries. Now how much harder does it become as a given European Muslim population creeps up from 5% to 6% and from there to 7%? Every day that passes, the problem becomes more difficult to even start to grapple with, as the demographic problem compounds every other aspect of the problem.


Let us review our progress so far. The apparatus of state in all European countries afflicted with large Muslim populations is being confronted with a Human Substrate Problem already severe and growing worse by the day. The best that said apparatus can do, at least in the absence of a two-tier legal system, and short of reducing the number of Muslims in the country through deportation, is to ensure that the Muslim incarceration point remains the baseline incarceration point for the whole society. However, even this optimal response will inflict significant costs of various sorts on the native populations, costs which will tend towards the unsupportable as the Muslim population of any given country a) grows in size and b) tends from Green to Orange. Furthermore, this response is, politically speaking, exceptionally difficult to implement, a fact testified to by the sheer feebleness of the response to Muslim criminality throughout Europe (a phenomenon represented by the sliding Muslim incarceration point in our model). As such, it will not be implemented until we hit a discontinuity of the type I have written about in the past, and the cancer of Muslim crime will spill out over an ever-greater swathe of our urban areas for some time.

The beauty of making bold, concrete predictions is that their falsifiability provides feedback as to the strengths and weaknesses of the analytical model that they stem from. Though the task of determining how much crime actually takes place in a given society is plagued by any number of methodological difficulties, trends in crime rates (as opposed to absolute rates at any given time) are relatively easy to get a grip on. Incarceration rates, by their nature, can be known with great accuracy. Expenditures on the various parts of the law enforcement apparatus and criminal justice system can also be known. These sorts of information, taken together, will provide a relatively straightforward way of determining how accurate my analysis is. Those who consider it to be flawed should, over time, be able to demonstrate just how flawed it is.

Assuming that my rudimentary model is as sound as it needs to be to allow a reasonably rigorous discussion of the problem, what are the implications for those opposing the Islamization of their countries? Readers of my past articles, most obviously SGW and related tracts, will not be looking to me for much optimism, and I have do not have much to offer. Eventually a discontinuity of the type I have predicted in the past will completely change the prevailing political paradigms and allow European societies to take the gloves off with respect to Islam.

That said, I am not advocating apathy. This essay is not a message of despair; consider it, if you will, a call to arms instead. The nature and severity of the problems we face are now sufficiently clear for European patriots to start asking themselves what actions they and others like them will eventually be called upon to take when the failure of the state reaches a critical point, and what sort of battlefield they will be arrayed upon at that moment.

Hopefully these people will find that their preparations are at least somewhat aided by the analysis herein, which I hope to continue and expand upon in future essays.

Previous posts by El Inglés:

2007 Nov 28 The Danish Civil War
2008 Apr 24 Surrender, Genocide… or What?
May 17 Sliding Into Irrelevance
Jul 5 A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 1
6 A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 2
8 A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 3
Aug 25 Identity, Immigration, and Islam
Oct 4 The Blackhoods of Antifa
26 Racists ’R’ Us
Nov 25 Surrender, Genocide… or What? — An Update
2009 Feb 16 Pick a Tribe, Any Tribe
Apr 11 Pick A Tribe, Any Tribe — Part II
May 18 To Push or to Squeeze?

About Eeyore

Canadian artist and counter-jihad and freedom of speech activist as well as devout Schrödinger's catholic

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.