About Eeyore

Canadian artist and counter-jihad and freedom of speech activist as well as devout Schrödinger's catholic

5 Replies to “The UN: What Hollywood would look like if it was more international”

  1. I’m not trying to be facetious or needlessly inflammatory here, but what purpose does it serve for America (and other Western countries) to remain in the UN? Is that institution doing some good, if only a little, somewhere in the world? Does it place a check on the power of China and Russia (because of the American veto)? That is the only positive that I can think of personally, but perhaps there ARE good reasons to remain in it.

    • Personally I agree the UN is a failed organization and needs to be disbanded.

      Having said that the UN headquarters in New York City is a very valuable intelligence asset to the US and our allies. I think the damage the UN does out weighs the good by several orders of magnitude but can’t get many politicians to pay attention to my opinion.

        • Good place to launch spies and traffickers into the USA.

          If America’s internal intelligence agencies were doing even a slight fraction of their homework, this would not be a problem. Instead, temporary visa recipients are not tracked and comprehensive monitoring of rightfully suspicious operatives is not maintained.

          This laxity was in place long before 0bama (think Bill Clinton). Nevertheless, BHO’s PC environment was the absolute worst accelerant for this exact sort of problem.

          Old Chinese proverb:

          “The beginning of wisdom is to call things their proper names.”

          — K’ung-fu-tzu

          When any talk of of terrorism is forbidden to mention Islam, there can be no beginning of wisdom.

      • … the UN headquarters in New York City is a very valuable intelligence asset to the US and our allies.

        This is the historical rationale behind having UN HQ on American soil.

        Time and again, this strategy is borne out because so many of the “diplomats” arriving from the shores of our Third World foes are so eager to get their fingers in the American pie, that they are almost totally clueless about spycraft and field work.

        Beyond that, many of them are monumentally, almost transcendently, STUPID. They are products of systems built on family connections; as in “who you know” (not what you know), and the preferential practices that are conjoined to these operational models cripple them.

        From: Norvell B. De Atkine’s utterly superb monograph, “Why Arabs Lose Wars

        This problem results from three main factors. First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs for anyone outside their own family adversely affects offensive operations. Exceptions to this pattern are limited to elite units (which throughout the Arab world have the same duty—to protect the regime, rather than the country). In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this orientation is also present in the military, particularly in the stress of battle. Offensive action, basically, consists of fire and maneuver. The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership.

        Second, the complex mosaic system of peoples creates additional problems for training, as rulers in the Middle East make use of the sectarian and tribal loyalties to maintain power. The ‘Alawi minority controls Syria, East Bankers control Jordan, Sunnis control Iraq, and Nejdis control Saudi Arabia. This has direct implications for the military, where sectarian considerations affect assignments and promotions. Some minorities (such the Circassians in Jordan or the Druze in Syria) tie their well-being to the ruling elite and perform critical protection roles; others (such as the Shi’a of Iraq) are excluded from the officer corps. In any case, the assignment of officers based on sectarian considerations works against assignments based on merit.

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