12 Replies to “How Israel defeated Russian anti-aircraft tech”
I just wish the Israeli military would blow them the hell right off the planet…
Too strong?
Israel has a limited number of air craft and a limited supply of munitions, the last I heard it would lake a month long 24/7 bombing campaign to take out all of the Iranian military. The Iranians have dispersed their military forces and equipment all around Iran.
The ‘baby step’ strategy is best. It costs them more, they find out their air force is useless, and demoralization sets in.
With the added advantage of making things harder for the civilians who dislike the Iranian government.
This is part of an elaborate semi-disinformation campaign.
Kind of a pas de deux between IDF and IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani.
In fact, the Russians haven’t turned on their fancy “game-changers”, the S-400 (or even the S-300). It was not top of the line stuff taken out, though still a loss to Assad.
Deconfliction: Russia and Israel use signals to avoid friendly fire.
Israel gave Russia advanced notice they were about to hit important Iranian targets near the Damascus airport. Russia warned Assad NOT to shoot back, he’d just give away air defense positions. But Assad did. Israel swooped down and took out what this video shows.
The exchange Jan. 21 is important in many ways. Not the least because of the sudden flood of “news” after decades of official Israeli policy to “neither confirm nor deny”. The strategy now is causing enemies to lose “face”. Which is a major escalation.
I can’t write it up right now, but here are some links:
Israel and Iran escalate their war of messages in Syria
Analysis: Tehran and Jerusalem are busy sending each other explosive signals of what they and will not tolerate, while Moscow’s influence grows – but at what price? https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5450429,00.html
…….. Israeli Strategy in Response to Changes in the Syrian Arena
The conditions for the campaign between wars, the strategy that Israel has pursued in the northern arena in recent years, have changed, and bring with them new risks that limit or even remove Israel’s freedom to continue operating in Syria. At the same time, the objectives of the strategy have changed, and some of the risks are also an opportunity.
If the original campaign between wars objective was to remove threats without resorting to a use of force that might lead to broad hostilities, today it can be argued that the objective is to prevent the buildup of a precision weapons echelon by Iran and Hezbollah in Israel’s first circle. This objective did not exist in 2013, but it now demands a primary national and military effort to defend a vital national interest in the Syrian and Lebanese arenas; this might require surgical attacks or larger operations, or even limited warfare.
The feasibility of operational action remains, since Israel can continue to achieve the operational objectives it seeks, and all that has changed is the risks and the costs involved. In the case of securing a vital national interest, such as preventing Iran and Hezbollah from building up a precision weapons echelon in Israel’s first circle, the current and emerging risks and costs should be incurred.
That Air-to-Surface Delilah sounds awfully similar to a source-guided missile. Those Russian platforms are such range that they’re most likely very dependent on active sensor–emitter systems (i.e., radar and radio-guidance suites).
Essentially, for a hunter–seeker searching in the high frequency spectrum, that Pantsir missile system’s truck is lit up like a millionaire’s Christmas tree. Not to mention how, switching over to passive-only mode (i.e., “going dark”) probably cripple’s the unit’s overall combat readiness.
Conspicuous, although very briefly alluded to, was the two square meter RCS (Radar Cross Section) offset threshold to prevent ground return or other minor clutter from giving false alerts. One of those Delilahs has a head-on RCS of around one square foot. In passive mode such a vehicle would likely be invisible.
Foregoing the detail of my last post about this, it’s a safe bet that Israel had some miniature disposable aerial telemetry drones loitering around to monitor the Pantsir sites whenever they illuminated (i.e., went into active emission mode).
Using very tight beam radio-relays, the drones could hoover up from different installations all of the ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) about various center frequencies, guidance bands, and so forth. These samplings would be immediately telemetered back to Israeli command centers (in case of drone loss).
Outbound ground attack sorties could be equipped with both ECM (Electronic Counter-Measures) and predetermined “hot” emitter signatures that are programmed pre-flight into their Source Guided Missiles. This was done decades ago in the Beqaa Valley and there’s no reason why the same approach (in a far more updated and stealthy mission profile) shouldn’t keep cleaning terrorist clocks.
As to reports of al Quds elements of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) taking a group dirt nap, short of action within Iran’s borders, toe-tagging some of the mullahs’ elite bacha bazi has to be a satisfying second choice.
NorseRadish … I disagree about the PANTIR S1 detection capability (MDS). Given today’s low noise receivers , it can likely detect 0.1square meter drones , but that is not the problem. The problem is false alarms. If it locks onto all the false alarms that potentially looks like an attacking target it will be firing all the time .. enter the human operator.
The Pantsir S1 job is to protect the S200/300/400 missile defense systems , and once it is taken out the S200/300/400 systems are done once they radiate.
It appears that the Pantsir S1 has quite good detection capability but that is a double edged sword as it will be cursed by road traffic , some of which will appear not unlike a slow drone moving in a straight line. In addition a low flying drone will will compete with ground clutter (sub clutter visibility) , so it will likely fade in and out , much like road traffic and birds.
The video alluded to the fact that the operators were often confused by birds. In fact the radar likely has lots of false alarms due to birds , road traffic and clutter (even though it is a doppler system). It also seems that in automatic mode it only initiates a track on a detection which looks like a valid target (RCS , speed , heading etc).
It almost sounds like the system requires an operator to manually initiate a track for small noisy targets as opposed to air aircraft at altitude with a good SNR (signal to noise ratio).
From the video it seems that the operator must initiate a track on slow moving / fluctuating targets , or perhaps must confirm a track automatically initiated. If that is the case then someone has to watch the screen 24/7 and will quickly become mentally asleep except for short periods. The best time to attack is then at the end of a shift when everyone is really tired.
No doubt the Israelis have some low cost decoy drones with a small corner reflector mounted in the nose so it looks like a real aircraft. Send one out along with a killer drone and once the Pantsir radiates .. boom.
I wouldn’t bet my life on the accuracy of this video.
Iran “Angry” at Russia’s Failure to Activate S-300 Air Defense System in Syria
Heshmatollah Falahat-Pisheh, head of the Iranian Parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee, expressed “anger” on Thursday at Russia’s failure to activate the S-300 air defense system deployed in Syria during a recent Israeli airstrike near Damascus, IRNA reported.
“It seems that there is a kind of coordination between Israel’s attacks and the Russian air defense deployed in Syria,” he said.
Russia’s rebuke of Israel’s Syria strikes wasnt mere lip service
Analysis: By making itself the sole superpower in the region, Moscow must create balance that keeps everyone happy; but the Israelis, the Syrians and the Iranians are all griping and fighting to advance their own interests.
Same paper, this time trivializing the situation. Nobody poised on the brink of war should be this glib. And leave the taunting to blowhard Arabs.
How Iran walked into Israel’s trap
Opinion: Just like last May, the IDF set up the Iranians in Syria with a well-laid plan to take out their military installations, but while it celebrates this achievement, it should also beware of unforeseen consequences.
I just wish the Israeli military would blow them the hell right off the planet…
Too strong?
Israel has a limited number of air craft and a limited supply of munitions, the last I heard it would lake a month long 24/7 bombing campaign to take out all of the Iranian military. The Iranians have dispersed their military forces and equipment all around Iran.
The ‘baby step’ strategy is best. It costs them more, they find out their air force is useless, and demoralization sets in.
With the added advantage of making things harder for the civilians who dislike the Iranian government.
This is part of an elaborate semi-disinformation campaign.
Kind of a pas de deux between IDF and IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani.
In fact, the Russians haven’t turned on their fancy “game-changers”, the S-400 (or even the S-300). It was not top of the line stuff taken out, though still a loss to Assad.
Deconfliction: Russia and Israel use signals to avoid friendly fire.
Israel gave Russia advanced notice they were about to hit important Iranian targets near the Damascus airport. Russia warned Assad NOT to shoot back, he’d just give away air defense positions. But Assad did. Israel swooped down and took out what this video shows.
The exchange Jan. 21 is important in many ways. Not the least because of the sudden flood of “news” after decades of official Israeli policy to “neither confirm nor deny”. The strategy now is causing enemies to lose “face”. Which is a major escalation.
I can’t write it up right now, but here are some links:
Israel and Iran escalate their war of messages in Syria
Analysis: Tehran and Jerusalem are busy sending each other explosive signals of what they and will not tolerate, while Moscow’s influence grows – but at what price?
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5450429,00.html
……..
Israeli Strategy in Response to Changes in the Syrian Arena
The conditions for the campaign between wars, the strategy that Israel has pursued in the northern arena in recent years, have changed, and bring with them new risks that limit or even remove Israel’s freedom to continue operating in Syria. At the same time, the objectives of the strategy have changed, and some of the risks are also an opportunity.
If the original campaign between wars objective was to remove threats without resorting to a use of force that might lead to broad hostilities, today it can be argued that the objective is to prevent the buildup of a precision weapons echelon by Iran and Hezbollah in Israel’s first circle. This objective did not exist in 2013, but it now demands a primary national and military effort to defend a vital national interest in the Syrian and Lebanese arenas; this might require surgical attacks or larger operations, or even limited warfare.
The feasibility of operational action remains, since Israel can continue to achieve the operational objectives it seeks, and all that has changed is the risks and the costs involved. In the case of securing a vital national interest, such as preventing Iran and Hezbollah from building up a precision weapons echelon in Israel’s first circle, the current and emerging risks and costs should be incurred.
http://www.inss.org.il/publication/israeli-strategy-response-changes-syrian-arena/
Here Is What We Know About Syria’s Air Defense, With Notes
https://sethfrantzman.com/2018/12/26/here-is-what-we-know-about-syrias-air-defense-with-notes/
……
WHY HASN’T SYRIA USED THE S-300?
When the S-300 missile system was deployed it was portrayed as a game changer. But Reuters had reported in 2015 and again in October 2018 that Israel had trained against the S-300 system in Greece.
https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Why-hasnt-Syria-used-the-S-300-578172
That Air-to-Surface Delilah sounds awfully similar to a source-guided missile. Those Russian platforms are such range that they’re most likely very dependent on active sensor–emitter systems (i.e., radar and radio-guidance suites).
Essentially, for a hunter–seeker searching in the high frequency spectrum, that Pantsir missile system’s truck is lit up like a millionaire’s Christmas tree. Not to mention how, switching over to passive-only mode (i.e., “going dark”) probably cripple’s the unit’s overall combat readiness.
Conspicuous, although very briefly alluded to, was the two square meter RCS (Radar Cross Section) offset threshold to prevent ground return or other minor clutter from giving false alerts. One of those Delilahs has a head-on RCS of around one square foot. In passive mode such a vehicle would likely be invisible.
Foregoing the detail of my last post about this, it’s a safe bet that Israel had some miniature disposable aerial telemetry drones loitering around to monitor the Pantsir sites whenever they illuminated (i.e., went into active emission mode).
Using very tight beam radio-relays, the drones could hoover up from different installations all of the ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) about various center frequencies, guidance bands, and so forth. These samplings would be immediately telemetered back to Israeli command centers (in case of drone loss).
Outbound ground attack sorties could be equipped with both ECM (Electronic Counter-Measures) and predetermined “hot” emitter signatures that are programmed pre-flight into their Source Guided Missiles. This was done decades ago in the Beqaa Valley and there’s no reason why the same approach (in a far more updated and stealthy mission profile) shouldn’t keep cleaning terrorist clocks.
As to reports of al Quds elements of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) taking a group dirt nap, short of action within Iran’s borders, toe-tagging some of the mullahs’ elite bacha bazi has to be a satisfying second choice.
NorseRadish … I disagree about the PANTIR S1 detection capability (MDS). Given today’s low noise receivers , it can likely detect 0.1square meter drones , but that is not the problem. The problem is false alarms. If it locks onto all the false alarms that potentially looks like an attacking target it will be firing all the time .. enter the human operator.
The Pantsir S1 job is to protect the S200/300/400 missile defense systems , and once it is taken out the S200/300/400 systems are done once they radiate.
It appears that the Pantsir S1 has quite good detection capability but that is a double edged sword as it will be cursed by road traffic , some of which will appear not unlike a slow drone moving in a straight line. In addition a low flying drone will will compete with ground clutter (sub clutter visibility) , so it will likely fade in and out , much like road traffic and birds.
The video alluded to the fact that the operators were often confused by birds. In fact the radar likely has lots of false alarms due to birds , road traffic and clutter (even though it is a doppler system). It also seems that in automatic mode it only initiates a track on a detection which looks like a valid target (RCS , speed , heading etc).
It almost sounds like the system requires an operator to manually initiate a track for small noisy targets as opposed to air aircraft at altitude with a good SNR (signal to noise ratio).
From the video it seems that the operator must initiate a track on slow moving / fluctuating targets , or perhaps must confirm a track automatically initiated. If that is the case then someone has to watch the screen 24/7 and will quickly become mentally asleep except for short periods. The best time to attack is then at the end of a shift when everyone is really tired.
No doubt the Israelis have some low cost decoy drones with a small corner reflector mounted in the nose so it looks like a real aircraft. Send one out along with a killer drone and once the Pantsir radiates .. boom.
I wouldn’t bet my life on the accuracy of this video.
Iran “Angry” at Russia’s Failure to Activate S-300 Air Defense System in Syria
Heshmatollah Falahat-Pisheh, head of the Iranian Parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee, expressed “anger” on Thursday at Russia’s failure to activate the S-300 air defense system deployed in Syria during a recent Israeli airstrike near Damascus, IRNA reported.
“It seems that there is a kind of coordination between Israel’s attacks and the Russian air defense deployed in Syria,” he said.
https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1561341/iran-‘angry’-over-failure-activate-s-300-system-syria
….
duh, ya think?Leftist Israeli source:
Russia’s rebuke of Israel’s Syria strikes wasnt mere lip service
Analysis: By making itself the sole superpower in the region, Moscow must create balance that keeps everyone happy; but the Israelis, the Syrians and the Iranians are all griping and fighting to advance their own interests.
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5452190,00.html
Same paper, this time trivializing the situation. Nobody poised on the brink of war should be this glib. And leave the taunting to blowhard Arabs.
How Iran walked into Israel’s trap
Opinion: Just like last May, the IDF set up the Iranians in Syria with a well-laid plan to take out their military installations, but while it celebrates this achievement, it should also beware of unforeseen consequences.
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5451086,00.html